This article compares the nation-building processes in four well-established Eurasian de facto states. Although all four pursue a set of identity politics that would legitimize the separatist cause, comparing them reveals important differences in boundary-making strategies. While maintaining the image of the enemy parent-state and of an imminent external threat is a common endeavor, they face different challenges and thus have pursued different strategies of identity-building. Transnistria and Abkhazia are two ethnically heterogeneous entities while Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia are more homogeneous since (forced) displacements, mostly of non-titular ethnicities, took place. The Abkhazs, Ossetians, and Armenians claim titular status in their respective regions, but only the latter two have kin in neighboring countries with whom they want to unify. Meanwhile, the “Transnistrian people” is a newly invented construct. Despite their lack of international recognition, the article demonstrates that – apart from a special emphasis on cultivating the image of the “enemy parent-state” – the nation-building mechanisms in the de facto states do not substantially differ from the processes at work in other post-Soviet states presented in this Special Issue.

The new mineral gazeevite, BaCa6(SiO4)2(SO4)2O (R3m, a = 7.1540(1), c = 25.1242(5) Å, V = 1113.58(3) Å3, Z = 3), was found in an altered xenolith in rhyodacites ofthe Shadil-Khokh volcano, Southern Ossetia and at three localities in larnite pyrometamorphic rocks of the Hatrurim Complex; Nahal Darga and Jabel Harmun, Judean Mountains, Palestinian Autonomy, and Har Parsa, Negev Desert, Israel. Larnite, fluorellestadite–fluorapatite, srebrodolskite–brownmilleriteand mayenite-supergroup minerals are the main minerals commonly associated with gazeevite. Gazeevite is isostructural with zadovite and aradite; the 1:1 type AB6(TO4)2(TO4)2W, occurs together with the structurallyrelated minerals of the nabimusaite series, 3:1 type AB12(TO4)4(TO4)2W3, where A = Ba, K, Sr...; B = Ca, Na...; T = Si, P, V5+, S6+, Al...; W = O2–,F–. Single antiperovskite layers {[WB6](TO4)2} in the structure type of gazeevite–zadovite and triple {[W3B12](TO4)4} layers in arctite–nabimusaite areintercalated with single A(TO4) layers. These minerals with an interrupted antiperovskite structure are characterized by a modular layered structure derived from hatrurite, Ca3(SiO4)O. Gazeevite is colourless, transparent, with a white streakand vitreous lustre. Gazeevite is brittle, shows pronounced parting and imperfect cleavage on {001}; it is uniaxial (–), ω = 1.640(3), ε = 1.636(2) (λ = 589 nm) and nonpleochroic; Mohs' hardness is ∼4.5, VHN50 = 417 kg mm–2. The calculateddensity is = 3.39 g cm–3. The main lines of the calculated powder X-ray diffraction pattern are as follows (d(Å)/I/hkl): 3.58/100/110, 3.07/91/021, 2.76/47/116, 1.789/73/220, 3.29/60/113, 2.78/36/024, 2.12/25/125, 2.21/21/208. Raman spectra of gazeeviteare compared with spectra of other minerals. The formation of gazeevite and minerals of the nabimusaite–dargaite series is connected with high-temperature alteration of an early assemblage of clinker minerals affected by later fluids generated by volcanic activity or combustion processes.

This paper compares the escalation of civil war in South Ossetia and Kosovo and shows how different modes of transition deeply influenced the timing and type of conflict in these two cases. It argues that regimes resulting from a transition from above – when the elite in power leads the process of regime change and imposes its political agenda on other social actors – are more likely to ensure political stability in the short term, since governments are more cohesive internally, enjoy the support of the military, and can rely on a loyal bureaucracy. In contrast, regimes that emerge from transitions from below are more likely to experience civil war with an ethnic minority in the short term because of an intrinsic weakness of the elite in power. Under these circumstances, the newcomers need to win the loyalty of the military and of the bureaucracy, and separatist groups can take advantage of the incumbents’ weaknesses and try to build resources to militarily challenge the state.

Following the August War of 2008, Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Both territories remain dependent upon Moscow for their security and economic survival, and they remain dominated militarily, economically, and even politically by their northern patron. These relationships are structured, in part, by a series of bilateral agreements signed since September 2008, which have created a comprehensive legal architecture which, in turn, deeply affects the state- and nation-building processes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This article examines 78 agreements signed between Russia and these territories between 2008 and 2015 in order to better understand these processes and how they interact with and are influenced by their respective relationships with the Russian Federation. It groups these agreements into three categories: the 2008 “friendship” agreements which created the initial baseline for the bilateral relationship; the numerous, more narrowly defined documents which fleshed-out this relationship; and the “alliance” and “integration” agreements signed with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, respectively, through which Moscow sought to take its relations with these territories to a qualitatively new level. Of particular focus is the degree to which these territories exhibited signs of independent agency and formal autonomy, as well as the differences between them.

Since the launch of the first commercial very high resolution satellite sensor in 1999 there has been a growing awareness and application of space technology for the remote identification of potential violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. As examined in the three cases of armed conflict in Gaza, Georgia, and Sri Lanka, analysis of satellite imagery was able to provide investigators with independent, verifiable, and compelling evidence of serious violations of international humanitarian law. Also examined are the important limitations to such imagery-based analysis, including the larger technical, analytical, and political challenges facing the humanitarian and human rights community for conducting satellite-based analysis in the future.

The Taiwan model of conflict transformation and the Kosovo model of conflict settlement have specific features, and are useful for analyzing the Georgian and Russian policies toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There is a similarity between the Georgian strategy of engagement and the Taiwan model, with its declared readiness to interact with the other party regardless of any setbacks arising over the issue of status. Unlike the Taiwan model, however, the Georgian strategy includes no concrete view on how to involve the authorities controlling the breakaway territories or, in particular, how to have a positive impact on their relations with the outside world. A comparison between the Kosovo model and Russian policies toward these two entities demonstrates that, in deciding to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow largely drew on the moral and legal arguments put forward for the recognition of Kosovo. Russia has established political oversight over these entities, to a certain extent mirroring the Western policy of supervised independence for Kosovo. But Russia is still unable to adopt a conflict resolution policy toward Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia that is based on regional integration prospects, in contrast to Western policies toward the Balkans.