The scarcity of land and resulting high prices have important implications for the prospect of industrialisation in Bangladesh. The situation is yet more complicated due to the weak land management system, which perpetuates land grabbing, high rent generation, and ineffective property rights. This chapter analyses the importance of a well-functioning land management in Bangladesh. It elaborates on the history of the policy reforms and the evolution of rules and regulations related to land administrative and management in Bangladesh and analyses institutional complexities in the current system of land management. It also explores how the SEZs initiative has emerged as an alternative management system and the complexities related to the acquisition of land for SEZs. This chapter shows that the institutional mechanisms of land acquisition and compensation are subject to a range of corrupt practices, which in turn create vested interests that resist change and a bias towards politically connected purchasers, or towards those willing and able to pay bribes. Such an environment is inimical to a good business climate and undermines the strategic economic purpose of the SEZs.

The scarcity of land and resulting high prices have important implications for the prospect of industrialisation in Bangladesh. The situation is yet more complicated due to the weak land management system, which perpetuates land grabbing, high rent generation, and ineffective property rights. This chapter analyses the importance of a well-functioning land management in Bangladesh. It elaborates on the history of the policy reforms and the evolution of rules and regulations related to land administrative and management in Bangladesh and analyses institutional complexities in the current system of land management. It also explores how the SEZs initiative has emerged as an alternative management system and the complexities related to the acquisition of land for SEZs. This chapter shows that the institutional mechanisms of land acquisition and compensation are subject to a range of corrupt practices, which in turn create vested interests that resist change and a bias towards politically connected purchasers, or towards those willing and able to pay bribes. Such an environment is inimical to a good business climate and undermines the strategic economic purpose of the SEZs.

For the purposes of this chapter, our focus will be on Regulation No 4 (2005), known as the QFC Contract Regulations. This was one of the first Regulations adopted following the creation of the QFC, which in turn evinces the determination to create a legal system that is distinct from ordinary Qatari law.

International commercial courts are ‘international’ in that they perform functions that may be characterized as international. First, all ICommCs of the three categories presented in the chapter are domestic courts for international commercial disputes, or international business, more broadly defined. Second, they allow the internationalization of domestic legal orders by helping a jurisdiction attract foreign capital, and become a global and regional dispute resolution hub. ICommCs’ functional internationalism spills over into their organizational and procedural design. While ICommCs may be seen as hybrid institutions – between the national and the international, the public and the private, the formal and the informal – the chapter brings to light the new institutional mechanisms of interoperability between them and other dispute resolution fora – domestic courts, international commercial arbitration and international courts and tribunals. The functional interoperability will eventually determine the durability of ICommCs.

A special economic zone (SEZ) is considered as a successful policy instrument in China’s own reform. Not only Chinese government and enterprises, but also African governments want to borrow this model to stimulate development in Africa. A handful of Chinese economic cooperation zones have been constructed in Africa since early 2000s, but the outcome was not satisfactory. By tracking the progress of six major cooperation zones, the author argues that there is no so-called “Chinese Model” of SEZ development. The key to SEZs’ success is to build synergism between the zones and the host countries’ structural transformation. Situated in very different political-economic contexts, the Sino-African cooperation zones struggle to build their connection with the development of host countries in terms of infrastructure harmonization, skill spillover, business linkage, and strategy coordination. However, after decade-long experiments, the zones have generated incremental policy impacts. Ethiopia, Egypt, and Zambia launched new industrial zone programs with Chinese participation, while other countries gave different degrees of support for building zones. Coupled with a large amount of inflowing manufacturing investments from China, the renewed initiative of zonal development is poised to impact Africa’s industrial landscape.