We study the optimal investment-reinsurance problem in the context of equity-linked insurance products. Such products often have a capital guarantee, which can motivate insurers to purchase reinsurance. Since a reinsurance contract implies an interaction between the insurer and the reinsurer, we model the optimization problem as a Stackelberg game. The reinsurer is the leader in the game and maximizes its expected utility by selecting its optimal investment strategy and a safety loading in the reinsurance contract it offers to the insurer. The reinsurer can assess how the insurer will rationally react on each action of the reinsurer. The insurance company is the follower and maximizes its expected utility by choosing its investment strategy and the amount of reinsurance the company purchases at the price offered by the reinsurer. In this game, we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium for general utility functions. For power utility functions, we calculate the equilibrium explicitly and find that the reinsurer selects the largest reinsurance premium such that the insurer may still buy the maximal amount of reinsurance. Since in the equilibrium the insurer is indifferent in the amount of reinsurance, in practice, the reinsurer should consider charging a smaller reinsurance premium than the equilibrium one. Therefore, we propose several criteria for choosing such a discount rate and investigate its wealth-equivalent impact on the expected utility of each party.

We consider a two-echelon production inventory system with a manufacturer having limited production capacity and a distribution center (DC). There is a positive transportation time between the manufacturer and the DC. Customers gain a value by receiving the product and incur a waiting cost when facing a delay. We assume that customers' waiting cost depends on their degree of impatience with respect to delay, which is captured by a convex waiting cost function. Customers are strategic with respect to joining the system and either place an order or balk from the system upon their arrival depending on their expected waiting time. We study the Stackelberg equilibrium assuming that the DC acts as a Stackelberg leader and customers are the followers. We first obtain the total expected revenue and then provide a heuristic to derive the optimal base-stock levels in the warehouse and the DC as well as the optimal price of the product.