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Hugo Grotius is best known as one of the originators of international law. Philosophers of the period also saw him as making a fundamental break with ancient philosophy and Thomistic classical natural law deriving from Aristotle. Grotius carried forward an important distinction made by Francisco Suarez between “law” and “counsel.” Good moral reasons may counsel action without yet requiring it. Law, by contrast, obligates, and obligation is conceptually related to accountability. It concerns what we would be blameworthy for failing to do without excuse. Grotius develops a theory of natural rights and law and sets the philosophical agenda by asking what could ground such a law (Anscombe’s Challenge). His response is human “sociability,” by which he means not simply any desire to affiliate, but the drive to live with others on terms of mutual accountability.
This chapter examines the early emergence of civilian protection norms in medieval Europe and traces their development in the religious and secular strands of just war theory. It argues that the Peace of God played social movement in medieval Europe played a key role in the emergence of the principle of civilian immunity. Second, it shows that the theory set forth in Chapter 2 provides a useful account of how the principle of civilian immunity arose in medieval Europe and why it persisted from the medieval period through the Enlightenment. Throughout, it examines the arguments of key just war theorists and international lawyers, including Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria, Suarez, Grotius, and Vattel.
This chapter traces two sets of arguments given by Suárez in Metaphysical Disputations xv. In the first set he confronts arguments intended to show that substantial forms do not, or indeed cannot, exist. Several of these arguments foreshadow in fairly obvious ways the arguments later deployed by Boyle, Locke, and others writing under their influence. Suárez has a clear if somewhat idiosyncratic conception of substantial form, one articulated, understandably enough, within the framework of his general Aristotelian hylomorphism. Suárez begins his consideration of the anti-substantial form position directly, even rather bluntly. It is important to bear in mind that Suárez's arguments on behalf of substantial form may be judged from two radically different vantage points. There are those who simply deny the phenomena, who think, for example, that there simply are no data of co-incidence, property subordination, or systemic equilibrium to be explained.
This chapter offers an exposition of Suárez's theory of distributive justice, which, until very recently, has not been the subject of scholarly attention. Suárez's immediate preoccupations were theological, there is a clear political dimension to his treatment. For Suárez politics provides the perfect platform for testing our intuitions about distributive justice. Suárez's discussion illuminates aspects of distributive justice too often overlooked by contemporary theorists. Suárez maintains that distributive justice is the sovereign's virtue, consisting in meeting and protecting the subjects' rights to acquire and remain in possession of portions of the common stock. These rights are created by a pact or conditional promise that specifies the personal qualities that ground the subject's rights to shares of the common stock. Distributive justice governs not only the fresh allocation of shares of the common stock, but also the conditions under which subjects can continue to own them.
Intentional action for Suárez occurs as the voluntarium, which consists in the occurrence of actions either of the will itself or of other capacities or faculties motivated by the will. Now Suárez's general conception of action is one he fully shares with such influential scholastic predecessors as Scotus and Aquinas. It is natural for many people nowadays to view freedom and law simply as phenomena that are opposed or that are at least in profound tension with each other. On this view, the function of law is to impose necessary constraints on freedom; and human freedom in turn imposes limits on the constraints that law can justifiably impose. For Suárez, the basic or foundational kind of freedom is freedom as a two-way metaphysical power. The distinctiveness of Suárez's view of freedom and the place he gives it in his moral theory can be appreciated by contrasting him with Hobbes.
Relations are a major topic in early modern philosophy, and not only on account of Leibniz. Following Aristotle, Suárez took some relations to be accidents constituting a category of their own. Like most scholastic philosophers and theologians, he considered such categorical relations to be ineliminable and real properties in their subjects, distinct from any other non-relational accidents. The term of a real categorical relation must be an actually existing entity, according to Suárez, and it must be really distinct from the foundation and the subject. Suárez argues against the view that there is a real distinction between foundation and relation on the grounds that it leads to unnecessary ontological profligacy. It could be argued further that if Suárez succeeds in avoiding the danger of undermining the reality of the relation, it is only at the cost of building an incoherent ineliminably relational reference to its term into the absolute foundation.
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