This paper argues that foreign direct investment (FDI) may increase the vulnerability to capital flow shocks of economies with credit market imperfections. Because of worse access to financial markets, wages in domestic firms carry higher default risk than wages in foreign ones. This alters the domestic wage composition and the subsequent wealth distribution. When credit markets are imperfect, the wealth distribution typically determines an economy's growth potential in autarky; hence, high exposure to FDI may significantly impede the capability to recover from sudden withdrawals of foreign capital. This appears consistent with a first glance at empirical evidence on durations of output recovery after systemic sudden stops.

This paper proposes a tractable sudden stop model to explain the main patterns in firm-level data from a sample of Southeast Asian firms during the Asian crisis. The model incorporates trend shocks and financial frictions, features that have so far been used separately in the literature on emerging markets. A negative shock to trend productivity growth can account, in our model, for the drop in output and its swift recovery together with the sizable and persistent downward adjustment in firms' Tobin's Q and debt levels. These patterns are broadly shared by most sudden stop episodes as documented in the literature. Trend shocks can also generate, in our model, strong leverage effects in line with the firm-level data and other observations from the literature.

Spain’s financial position during the late 19th and early 20th centuries has usually been presented as one of persistent deficit on current account, which resulted from her integration into international commodity and factor markets and this, in turn, slowed down the growth of the economy. In this essay a preliminary reconstruction of the balance of payments on current account allows us to reject this view. In fact, a net capital inflow made possible to meet the demand for investment-boosting economic performance. Current account reversals in a context of macroeconomic domestic imperfections help to explain the economic slowdown at the turn of the century.

In this paper I use historical data to analyze the relationship between crises and growth in Latin America. I calculate by how much the region's GDP per capita has been reduced as a consequence of the recu- rrence of external crises. I also analyze the determinants of major balan- ce of payments crises. The main conclusion is that it is unlikely that Latin America will, on average, experience a major improvement in long run growth in the future. It is possible that some countries will make progress in catching up with the advanced nations. This, however, will not be the norm; most Latin American countries are likely to fall further behind in relation to the Asian countries and other emerging nations. Not everything, however, is grim. My analysis also suggests that fewer Latin America countries will be subject to the type of catastrophic crises that affected the region in the past. Latin America's future will be one of «No crises and very modest growth».