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This chapter addresses the role of tax advice in encouraging aggressive and abusive tax planning by high-end taxpayers. It begins with a discussion of the different roles of tax advice, one of which is its use as a form of tax penalty insurance. The chapter then shows how the rich benefit disproportionately from the ability to avoid penalties through tax advice. After describing these effects, we offer a proposal for incorporating means adjustments into the tax penalty defense rules, focusing specifically on tax advice, and we respond to potential objections and concerns.
What are the weaknesses of the current tax compliance rules, and how can these rules more effectively address the challenge of high-end tax noncompliance? This chapter first describes the limitations of the traditional responses to tax noncompliance in the law and in prominent reform proposals. It then introduces a new approach: a system of means-adjusted tax compliance rules. As we argue, this approach can both complement the traditional responses to noncompliance and counter their limitations to build a more robust and effective tax compliance system. The final section of this chapter describes how introducing means adjustments to the tax compliance rules would not be a radically new direction for tax reform, but rather an extension and rationalization of principles that are already embedded in the current tax law.
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