The European Union's cooperation with Middle Eastern regimes to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism has received increased scholarly attention following several terrorist attacks in Europe the last decade. Despite the EU's emphasis on good governance, democracy, and human rights to prevent violent extremism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), I argue that the Union is in fact declining as a ‘normative power’ as it has prioritised a ‘security first’ centred approach. This article demonstrates how the EU's normative projects have, first, appropriated a logic of securitisation; and second, how the Union downplays democracy and good governance in fear of alienating authoritarian key partners in the region. There are consequently inherent limitations to, and contradictions in, the EU's Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Preventing Violent Extremism (PvE) efforts. These conclusions are based on interviews with EU representatives and implementing partners on the ground. The interviews are complemented by an analysis of the scope and focus of the EU's CT and PvE projects. The findings have implications for our understanding of normative powers’ priorities when facing a perceived dilemma of choosing between its security, on the one hand, and its identity and value aspirations, on the other.

This article scrutinizes the investment chapters in the new EU Free Trade Agreements from a transparency perspective. The article examines the claims that the dispute settlement mechanisms in the new treaties are sufficiently participatory and more transparent than their predecessors. Procedural standards related to confidentiality of proceedings shall be analysed in the context of existing transparency safeguards in investment arbitration. In addition to procedural guarantees of transparency, the article examines relevant substantive rules affecting participatory aspects of dispute settlement. Furthermore, the article discusses forum-shopping strategies of the parties in the field of investment-related disputes, including internal forum-shopping and parallel proceedings using different procedural mechanisms. In this context, lessons from other fields such as international commercial arbitration related to transparency (in cases in which public interest is present) are highlighted. The proposal for the establishment of an integrated, multilateral court for investment cases is also invoked.

The European Union is caught between technocracy and the politics of the exception, eroding in the process the very political sphere that makes democracy work. Partly a cause of this erosion and partly an effect, the EU retreats into the ‘rule of rules’ when faced with what are, in fact, profoundly political problems. Whether it be in response to the eurozone crisis, EU–Russia–Ukraine relations or the influx of refugees, the EU's policies led to conflicts over geopolitics, sovereignty and redistribution. Its apolitical responses were as ubiquitous as they were inadequate. They reflect Germany's preference for consensual politics, which is paradoxically enforced by Angela Merkel's dictum about there being ‘no alternative’. In order to think of alternatives to the Europe that exists, we need to revive ‘the political’, theorized by the likes of Carl Schmitt, Max Weber and Hannah Arendt at times when democracy was under duress.