Across the developed democracies, there has been a rise in populist nationalism and anti-globalization sentiment aimed at reasserting sovereignty through the state. This article develops the concept of discursive power as an alternative basis for citizens to project their voice and influence into global politics. Discursive power arises from the framing role of ideas in orienting citizen judgements to the possibilities for acting beyond the state, as a precursor to deliberative forms of persuasion and agreement. Discursive power is ‘democratic’, we argue, when it enables those affected by global issues and problems to conceive of themselves as collective agents capable of responding. Generating discursive power outside the state, however, requires informal representatives to serve as interlocutors. Drawing on recent theories of representation, we describe how the claims of non-state actors could support the production and mobilization of citizens' discursive powers across borders. Our analysis underscores the importance of claim-making for progressive responses to globalization centred on the judgements of citizens. We conclude by surveying several challenges for democratic discursive power at the transnational and global levels and suggest some background institutions and practices to enhance this power.

Existing discussions about shareholder control work with a state-centric and Westphalian conception of democracy. Therefore, they see the corporation as a state-analogue: shareholders (citizens) elect a board (legislature) charged with the responsibility to ensure that the executive follows their ‘collective interest’. We claim that state-centric models of democracy are not apt for an environment of corporate governance characterised by complex interdependence, porous boundaries, and criss-crossing relations of weak allegiances. Instead, we suggest that recent theories of transnational democracy provide us with better models for thinking about ‘popular’ control in such an environment. We look at shareholder democracy not as a system where a single body representing a ‘demos’ tries to control a single executive; instead, we view shareholders as constituting multiple dêmoi which must coordinate and collaborate to control multiple corporate executives. We emphasise deliberation and communicative power as a central mechanism for these dêmoi of shareholders to effectuate control.

Ordinarily, militant democracy is about restricting the rights of those who threaten to overthrow the very democracy that guarantees these rights. Hence, militant democracy permits the defence of democracy by disarming its opponents. Turkey’s recent constitutional reform, which arguably is a move away from liberal democracy, forces militant democracy to face up to its transnational application. Can we use militant democracy’s tools to defend not our own, but another democracy? Maybe we can and even should. This article examines the two transnational manifestations of militant democracy. The first is ‘transnational democracy gone militant’, epitomised by the European Union (EU)’s power to enforce liberal democratic standards in its Member States. The second is ‘militant democracy gone transnational’. This manifestation permits treating people rallying in the EU to attack democracy abroad in the same manner in which we are permitted to treat opponents of ‘our own’ democracy. As long as we are dealing with members of the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) gives us the instruments we need. Generally, militant democracy is a militant liberal democracy, which is not neutral towards itself, but is also an opponent of every system that is antithetical to it.