The years 2020 and 2021 will go down in history as the time when the COVID-19 pandemic caused the deepest recession of the century and killed and sickened many millions of people. Yet trade geeks might remember those years as the period during which gigantic advances were made in women’s leadership and influence on trade policies and trade systems. A woman took the helm of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development for the first time and a woman was once again appointed to lead the International Trade Centre. Also remarkably, after a slow start, a WTO Informal Working Group (IWG) on Trade and Gender was finally established in late 2020 (as the next step from the Joint Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment of 2017). This chapter leans and builds on the author’s previous work and provides an update on the IWG’s work and the engagement of WTO members (Friends of Gender) interested in contributing to that work. Based on limited information available, the chapter gauges how much of the IWG’s work programme has permeated into general WTO operations. In other words, it assesses (based on a text search) the degree to which the ongoing negotiations of trade rules/structural discussions on joint statement initiatives – investment facilitation, e-commerce, and micro, small, and medium enterprises – have taken a gendered lens. It also reports on the advances achieved in mainstreaming gender in the WTO Secretariat and membership representation in the WTO.

This chapter considers the theory’s implications for the significant issue of accountability in global governance. My reasoning may appear to suggest a fundamental tension between performance and accountability: If avoiding the thorniest obstacle to performance requires curtailing state influence in the policy process, international institutions presumably cannot be both effective and accountable. I argue, however, that if we embrace a more expansive understanding of how accountability may be institutionalized, no such tradeoff arises. This is because the same factors that nurture policy autonomy make institutions more likely to adopt a variety of modern accountability structures – what I call second-wave accountability (SWA) mechanisms – that primarily benefit and empower non-state actors. Once in place, moreover, SWA mechanisms can themselves deliver performance gains by revealing operational problems, improving the quality of decision-making, and boosting policy compliance. I provide two forms of empirical support for these claims: (1) statistical evidence based on novel data on the spread and strength of SWA mechanisms; and (2) a qualitative plausibility probe focusing on institutions in the issue area of economic development, where many SWA mechanisms were pioneered.

This chapter sheds light on the international organisations that have been active in proliferating leniency programmes. This contribution includes the efforts of the OECD, ICN, UNCTAD and ASEAN. For each of these organisations, the chapter argues that they have a tendency to look for the common elements among existing leniency programmes and present them as an international guideline or best practice. When the existing leniency programmes diverge, the international guideline or best practice is to offer options. By not further clarifying these options, the chapter holds, the international organisations do no more than summarise local practices and pull them outside of their context. Due to this practice, convergence is unlikely to happen because, when the international guidelines or best practices are consulted, there will be an automatic reflex to also consult existing local practices and the existing literature regarding those practices.

Africa has seen progress and setbacks with regard to the economic and socio-economic development after decolonization until ca. 2000. These are linked to historical and structural challenges, including the economic infrastructure the colonial powers left behind and the unfavourable geography of vast parts of the continent. In the post-colonial phase there has been much economic and trade dependence on the former colonial powers – giving rise to the dependency theory and the notion of neo-colonialism. There was often an unwillingness of the post-colonial leadership to set the course for the economies of their countries. And rentier states developed. Several initiatives – from Africa and beyond – have been proposed to deal with the economic misery, with those of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund being the dominant ones, pushing African initiatives aside.

At the Havana conference of 1947–1948, development emerged as the top priority of the International Trade Organization (ITO). But the failure to establish the ITO meant that developing countries had to work with GATT to make trade serve development goals. This chapter examines key moments (including rounds of trade negotiations, the establishment of UNCTAD, the opening of the International Trade Centre, the addition of a development chapter to the General Agreement, and the campaign to establish a New International Economic Order) and issues (such as quantitative restrictions, preferential tariffs, textiles) to try to make GATT and trade support developing countries. Clashing conceptions of development, the pursuit of individual priorities, and disagreements and rivalry among developing countries undermined efforts to reform GATT. Although developing countries have been portrayed as ill-suited to GATT, this chapter argues that they were constructive members, sometimes leaders and ultimately champions of GATT and a rules-based trade system. The story of development displaces the Cold War as the dominant framework of postwar international relations, challenges the idea of American hegemony, and reveals how GATT perpetuated a racialized global order.

On 1 May 1990, during the 18th Special Session on international economic cooperation, the General Assembly passed a resolution supporting a ‘Declaration on International Economic Co-operation, in Particular the Revitalization of Economic Growth in Development of the Developing Countries’. The overarching framework of the Declaration is the ‘strong commitment to a global consensus to promote urgently international economic co-operation for sustained growth of the world economy’ and the revitalisation of economic growth in developing countries after the 1980s, ‘a decade lost to development’. The Declaration was the product of a ‘long and arduous negotiations’ and ‘protracted … discussions’ which, after its adoption, was celebrated as a ‘pioneering landmark in the annals of international economic co-operation’. In retrospect though, it has been all but forgotten.