Compared with its relations with Asia, Australian engagement with the countries of the African continent was not extensive, and was defined even in the government’s view by a ’period of neglect’ by all sectors of government, including diplomacy, trade, aid and defence. That said, increased communication and involvement occurred in the period under reiew in this volume, as African immigration continued and as the Australian government sought African support in its bid for a United Nations Security Council seat for 2013–14. Formal government ties between Australia and the nations of Africa continued, however, to be limited. In this sense, there was little significant change in the period 2006–10 from previous periods.

This chapter considers the impact of the discovery of mandatory securitization on global security institutions. While ties of community and friendship, specifically at the sub-systemic level, ensure that the burden of mandatory securitization on the international community is relatively small, the international community – in the form of the UNSC – is obligated to act when (1) states or sub-systemic actors fail (note, in other-securitization they may fail for legitimate reasons), or (2) where there is no other designated protector. This chapter suggests that the UN charter amounts to a social contractual situation between the people of the world and the UNSC, rendering its duty to securitize – when conditions are met and there is no other protector – overriding. It goes on to examine the nature of these duties as they already exist by examining RtoP provisions. It shows that even if RtoP was in perfect working order and always acted on, it does not cover the moral duties of the UNSC regarding securitization; notably, it does not cover intent-lacking threats. Much like in Chapter 4 where mandatory securitization is used to update NATO’s Article 5, this chapter shows how mandatory securitization can refocus and thus help RtoP.

Cultural property has always been a target in armed conflicts. Even with the development of a regime for the protection of cultural property in armed conflict, such destructions continue to be a reality in contemporary armed conflicts. The effectiveness of this regime comes thus into question. This chapter aims to analyse a case study on the application of this regime: the Preah Vihear Temple case. During a fifty-five-year border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand in the area where the Temple is situated, several international forums have been seized with the protection of the Temple, including: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), UNESCO and a Joint Border Commission established by Cambodia and Thailand. This chapter will assess the contribution of all of these processes and agencies to the protection of cultural property in armed conflict regarding this study.

This chapter proceeds to the question of the authority of international criminal law. Although there are links between international criminal law and public international law, rooted in the treaty agreements which created the former, the partly compulsory nature of international criminal law sets it apart from other forms of public international law. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the way in which the Rome Statute’s jurisdiction, as its primary exercise of power, and, potentially, authority are set out in the treaty and how this may affect its authority. As its jurisdictional provisions also permit the UNSC to make referrals to the Court, where a situation threatens international peace and security, the question of this power going beyond ‘typical’ jurisdictional powers is discussed in the context of power politics. This will allow an exploration of the mechanism as a legitimate exercise of power.

Indirect regime change is, in principle, forbidden under international law because it affects the heart of a state’s domaine réservé. The inducement of oppositional TG aims at indirectly reconfiguring the constitutional order of the target state through TG. Applied as a coercive unilateral measure, it is hard to sustain that this practice complies with the principle of non-intervention. This conclusion suffers a theoretical and rather improbable exception: the scenario of constitutional texts explicitly and directly validating ius cogens violations. Another exception, which could become less theoretical, is when the UNSC induces an oppositional transition under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or authorises states to do so as a way to cope with a threat to or breach of international peace and security. In such cases, the UNSC could only empower an oppositional TA after a conscientious assessment of the TA’s compliance with ius in interregno.