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This chapter gives a detailed and dramatic account of the first year of the Juba Peace Talks between the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) and the Government of Uganda. It highlights the many tensions and contradictions that occurred, for example, the pressure to bring LRA senior commanders to the table while they feared for their security, Ugandan government insistence to put a deadline on the talks, the lack of capacity within the LRA/M delegation to deliver negotiation papers, the technical and military challenge to have the LRA fighters assemble, the contradictions within international approaches that simultaneously supported the ICC while also requesting that to back off. Ownership of the process became complex for the LRA/M who sought broad civil society participation while aiming to maintain their powerful hold on the process. In offering a narrative of the convoluted and complex events of this first year of peace talks, the chapter also argues that the developing dynamics of the talks made the pursuit of peace not just an unthankful but rather a damaging experience: For the LRA/M, the start to the negotiations was an experience of continuation, with existing political and military power relations entrenched, rather than transformed.
This chapter focuses on the 2008 events in the Juba Peace Talks between the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) and the Government of Uganda, which ended with joint military strikes by Ugandan and US forces (called Operation Lightning Thunder) against the LRA. LRA leader Joseph Kony had repeatedly failed to sign the Final Peace Agreement amidst growing confusion over demand and the role of the LRA/M delegates. In 2008, previously less obvious patterns of mistrust and miscommunication in the peace talks came to the fore, exacerbated by parallel preparations for war and peace and confusing international signals. The USA took on a new and prominent role, working behind the scenes to assure military preparations while also being an observer at the talks. Within the delegation, roles of individuals became increasingly bewildering. Yet despite the tremendous frustrations in the negotiation process and the missed opportunity to celebrate the Final Peace Agreement with a fully planned signing ceremony in the bush attended by 150 guests, the fall out of the military Operation Lightning Thunder shows the gravity of the decision to abandon the often-frustrating negotiation process in favour of what mistakenly continues to be sold as the quicker solution.
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