This chapter assesses whether, and to what extent, the mechanisms that underlie this book’s theory still operate in relation to two specific challenges in the current geopolitical landscape: (a) the rise of strategic competition from China and Russia and (b) the rise of nationalist and populist movements and parties in many partner nations. The chapter shows that for now any ambitious leaders who seek to replace the incumbents in their countries can still count on the fact that the United States continues to command large reservoirs of support among their fellow citizens, despite the clout that a rising China and a revanchist Russia may elicit. It also shows that populist parties are not by default anti-international or anti-US as long as aligning with the United States provides a pathway to political power. Hence, the prospects for the US world order might be brighter than usually imagined for no other reason than the United States can still impact the political success of incumbents and potential successors alike in the partner nations.

This chapter delves into US relations with the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq in the post-9/11 era. The chapter describes the idiosyncratic processes that led Afghanistan to have presidential institutions and Iraq to have parliamentary institutions. It then shows how the different constitutional arrangements in Afghanistan and Iraq changed the dynamics through which the United States interacted with incumbent leaders, and their potential successors, in the two countries. It analyzes the extent to which the United States was able to exercise leverage over the incumbent leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, given their different constitutional frameworks.

The final chapter rounds up the analysis and summarizes the main findings from all previous chapters. It concludes that the United States is indeed a sheriff, but a shrewd sheriff. The chapter contextualizes the main conclusions in the book within the current debates in academic and policy circles about the upending demise of the US world order. The chapter discusses the prospects of the US world order in light of the status of US domestic politics. That is the decisive debate: at the end of the day, that is where the sheriff gets its mandate. Regardless of whether the US world order is fading into the past or it is bound to endure in the future, the institutional logic of a consensual leadership will remain an original feature of how a democratic nation can manage and enforce a world order.

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the book. It shows that the conundrum of a consensual world order can be disentangled by analyzing the mechanisms through which incumbents and potential challengers can gain and maintain power. For the United States, the fundamental challenge is to channel the political ambitions of potential successor leaders toward good governance and respect of human rights while avoiding becoming entangled with any specific incumbent in partner nations. Domestic political institutions that foster political successors and allow for regular and flexible channels of leadership turnover make it easier for the United States to attain friendly relations by easing more accommodating leaders into power. In a special twist, institutions that allow for regular and flexible channels of leadership turnover also create domestic political incentives that foster the attainment of better governance and more respect of human rights. In contrast, domestic political institutions that concentrate power in the hands of the incumbents, and curtail political competition, make it more difficult for the United States to exercise influence.

This chapter places the book’s theory into a historical perspective: It describes several ways in which the United States has interacted with incumbent leaders, and their potential successors, in partner nations. From this, the chapter identifies and operationalizes the mechanisms of the book’s theory in respect to the domestic politics of partner countries, differentiating between democratic and authoritarian partners. The chapter also operationalizes four dimensions of the relations between the United States and its partners: (a) the alignment of the foreign policies of the United States and the partner nations’; (b) the likelihood of coups in the partner nations; (c) good governance through the provision of public goods; and (d) the respect of human rights. This chapter, therefore, sets the stage for the systematic empirical analysis of Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

This chapter states the purpose of the book and its main argument. How can a world order that aspires to be consensual be managed and enforced? The book offers a systematic exploration of the mechanisms through which the United States was able to sustain a consensual world order. As the hegemon and enforcer of its world order, the United States acted like a “sheriff.” But whenever and wherever the United States relied upon the political ambitions of potential successors to favor leadership turnover, it was able to fulfill its preferences and to achieve better governance and greater respect of human rights. That made the United States a shrewd sheriff. In contrast, whenever and wherever the United States relied upon established dictators poised to rule for life or democratic presidents with no viable competitors, it turned into a bad cop that would either countenance bad governance and human rights abuses or would resort to coercion and coups to achieve its political goals.