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In November 2023 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and Security Council elected (in one case, re-elected) five judges to the International Court of Justice. The electoral system is considered to be overly politicized and to pay lip service to the requirements that judges must be elected on the basis of their qualifications, regardless of their nationality, and that in the body as a whole, the representation of the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world should be assured. Several amendments to the system of nominations and elections have been proposed that would require a reform of the Court's Statute. This article proposes four measures that could be adopted without amending the Statute or encroaching on the prerogatives of national groups, UN organs or Member States: (1) ensure the representation of the principal legal systems, in part by promoting regional diversity on the bench; (2) remove the use of nationality as a factor in casual elections; (3) establish a vetting process and public hearings; and (4) promote a single vote for Security Council members. It argues that the measures proposed would lead to a change in the present culture of nominations and elections towards one that favours the qualification of the judges over political considerations.
The United Nations (UN) General Assembly High-Level Meeting (HLM) on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response (PPPR) was a missed opportunity to bring high-level commitment and momentum to the global governance of health emergencies. Intended to bring much-needed attention to a policy issue that is rapidly slipping down the international agenda, the fraught diplomacy among member states, lack of consensus on key issues, and weak UN Political Declaration in New York foreshadow a difficult road ahead for upcoming negotiations under the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. This column chronicles the evolving engagement of the UN in global health governance, examines the diplomatic process leading to the UN HLM on PPPR, and assesses the contributions and missed opportunities of its resulting Political Declaration.
This article introduces the concept of international clientelism and discusses how this diplomatic tool was employed by Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro as a means to get political support from several Latin American and Caribbean countries. We operationalize the concept and apply it to assess Venezuelan practices put forth in the region. We argue that the reach of Caracas’s diplomatic strategy is broader and deeper than that of simple vote-buying tactics, as it implies the promotion of structural rather than contingent ties, shielding the country against unfavorable moves in international fora. An empirical test using data for all LAC countries for the years 1999–2015 confirms that clientelistic linkages produced political support for Venezuela at the United Nations General Assembly while also moving its partners away from the United States in that institution.
In 2021, unconstitutional transfers of power in Myanmar and Afghanistan highlighted that while States may desire a coherent response to questions about the status of governments, and may look for international guidance in such regard, there is no established process for providing such guidance. Thus, attention focuses on the General Assembly's credentials process, designed to assess the eligibility of delegates to represent their States at the UN. This article proposes that rather than the credentials process being stretched in this way, greater use should be made of the Assembly's competence to pass determinative resolutions on government legitimacy.
The rise of non-Western powers has led to competing claims about how these states act among each other and how they behave vis-à-vis established powers. Existing accounts argue that the rising powers are a heterogenous group of competing states and that they are socialized into the existing Western-centered order. This article challenges these claims, arguing that the rising powers are dissatisfied with the international status quo and that they have begun to form a bloc against the established powers. The authors contend that this dissatisfaction arises from their lack of influence on the international stage, their status in the international hierarchy and the norms that sustain the current international order. They maintain that the formation of a rising powers bloc is driven by the countries’ economic growth and international dynamics, fostering their institutionalization as IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). To support this argument, the study combines spatial modeling techniques to analyze rising power voting behavior in the UN General Assembly over the period 1992–2011.
This chapter asks how do international institutions adjust to changes in the number, diversity, and relative power of system members? It combines the Weberian concept of social closure and the idea of club goods to argue that, as IOs come under pressure to open up to new and more heterogenous members, the logic of closure creates incentives for incumbent members to create institutional designs that preserve their privileges. In the face of membership diversity, rules that promote procedural equality—i.e., consensus and majority voting rules—challenge status quo interests. In response, incumbents pursue designs that preserve clubs of like-minded actors through assimilative, hierarchical or exclusive multilateralism. The chapter discusses how self-determination, the principled basis for membership expansion, serves as a rule of closure. Then it considers the cases of the United Nations at its founding, the United Nations during its main period of expansion under demands for a New International Economic Order, and the G20, which many have pointed to as a new model of inclusive governance. Each case shows how expanding institutional membership may improve formal equality while triggering a decrease in procedural equality, creating institutional arrangements in which all are equal, but some are more equal than others.
All Canadian governments say that Canada must look to its friends and allies and like-minded partners to achieve greater cooperation on global issues. But who are these countries exactly? To gain a better understanding of where Ottawa stands in the world, with whom and under what conditions, we analyze Canada's voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly from 1980 to 2017. We find that Canada's overall record tends toward that of Western European states. We find no evidence of greater affinity with US positions either when the Democrats are in power in Washington or when the conservative parties are in power in Ottawa. We identify a sharp pro-US turn in the Harper years and also confirm that the government of Justin Trudeau started off by maintaining rather than reversing this trend.
Because of its transboundary effects and because states will be the primary actors, large-scale solar geoengineering and its governance are matters of international law. This is the final of four chapters that consider international legal rules, here those that fall outside the previous chapters’ scopes. Multilateral agreements govern activities and impacts in areas beyond national jurisdiction, including Antarctica, outer space, and the oceans. The comprehensive UN Convention on the Law of the Sea governs solar geoengineering that would take place in the marine environment or would likely result in deleterious effects there. The parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, a far-reaching agreement, have issued three nonbinding decisions concerning geoengineering, the only such negotiated consensuses from representatives of most countries. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques proscribes solar geoengineering's hostile use. Among the four major international legal forums that help resolve disputes in broad ranges of issues, the UN Security Council could address problematic or contentious solar geoengineering.
On 11 April 1997, the text of the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses was presented by the Working Group of the Whole (WG) of the United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This Convention is based on the 1994 Draft Articles on the same topic prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC). These Draft Articles were approved on second reading by the ILC during its 46th session in 1994 and subsequently submitted to the 49th session of the UNGA in 1994 for consideration by states. By its Resolution 49/52, the UNGA invited states to present written submissions to comment on the Draft Articles and at the same time it proposed that a working group on the whole of the UNGA Sixth Committee be established to convene during the 51st session of UNGA (September-December 1996) to elaborate the text for a convention. During its first session, the WG did not manage to accomplish this task. The final text submitted to the UNGA on 11 April 1997 was the result of the second session of the WG which had deliberated during the period from 24 March to 4 April 1997.
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