Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs) may play an important role in lowering the economic costs of greenhouse gas mitigation and in overcoming political-economy constraints on the use of carbon taxes or equivalent measures. A carbon tax plus a full BCA could deal with the competitiveness challenges arising from carbon taxes by using the WTO's National Treatment principle to apply equal levies on domestic production and on imports, and by symmetrically rebating the carbon tax on exports in the manner of a value-added tax (VAT) export rebate. This approach would shift the base for carbon taxation from production to demand and potentially achieve substantial reductions in the cost of cutting emissions. It would avoid the massive measurement and compliance problems associated with BCAs based on foreign emission intensities. By contrast, import-only BCAs distort prices of importables relative to exportables; create divisive trade conflicts and deterioration in the terms of trade for developing countries; and likely require development of complex sets of import preferences.

Value-added tax, the most common form of consumption tax in the world, operates on a destination principle to ensure it is levied only in the place of final consumption in cases of cross-border transactions. The international trade in services and intangibles through digital means poses two challenges: finding the place of consumption and collecting the tax when services supplied by businesses in one jurisdiction are instantaneously consumed by customers in another. This article examines these challenges and considers how unilateral action and soft international responses have so far failed to achieve consistent destination basis taxation. An alternative option would be to adopt a hard multilateral response that would overcome the limitations of unilateralism and soft-law approaches and achieve consistent destination basis taxation in the digitalised economy.

Value Added Tax (VAT) is a tax on the value added at each stage of the production and distribution process and on the importation of goods. VAT registered importers in Uganda are charged the statutory VAT rate of 18 per cent, however, importers that are not VAT registered are charged both the 18 per cent and an additional 15 per cent, which is designated “Domestic VAT”. The statutory basis of the 15 per cent is unclear. Domestic VAT appears to be a tax created by the Uganda Revenue Authority in a bid to raise revenue from a largely non-compliant base. The legality of the tax was challenged in Margaret Akiiki Rwaheru and 13,945 Others v Uganda Revenue Authority. The court ruled that Domestic VAT was irregular when applied to importers who qualified to register for VAT but had not registered, but was illegal when applied to importers who did not qualify to register for VAT. Despite this ruling, the URA has continued to charge all importers Domestic VAT, regardless of whether they qualify to register for VAT. This article seeks to re-examine the legality of Domestic VAT.

VAT is an important but at the same time long neglected issue in social policy literature. The way in which taxes are levied has important implications for citizens in terms of equity and efficiency effects. Rate diversification is embedded in VAT planning across the EU, which enables Member States to address particular welfare objectives and tackle VAT's regressivity. Nonetheless, for some, this undermines the uniformity and effectiveness of a pan-European VAT system comprised of the so-called ideal single-rate VAT structure which could bring more money into state budgets and, thus, allow for more generous welfare provision. This paper evaluates arguments put forward by both sides, concluding that in times of crisis, where governments might advance VAT streamlining purely in order to deal with deficit constraints instead of fairer redistribution, the regime currently in place is the most pragmatic solution from a pro-welfare perspective.