Borrowing Gerry Simpson’s taxonomy, it was and remains common to think of the Soviet Union as both a ‘great power’ and an ‘outlaw state’. Some historical accounts portray Soviet law as elaborate, specific and complex; but simultaneously, others portray ‘Soviet law’ as a sham. This essay argues that the Soviet approach to Cold War international law hews closer to the former image than the latter. It appears that Soviet faith in international law grew over the course of the Cold War, rather than diminished. This essay is a tentative sketch of the transformation of Soviet faith in law over the course of the Cold War.

The fall of the Qing dynasty was followed by the successive creation of two republics: the Republic of China (‘ROC’), established in 1912 and ultimately dominated by the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’), established in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’) headed by Mao Zedong. Treatment of the two Chinas in the international arena could hardly have been more different. Never exercising more than nominal control over the entirety of the territory it claimed, the ROC was riven by an endless succession of warlords, an even greater number of Westerners holding onto semi-colonial privileges they claimed to have inherited from the Qing, a civil war between Nationalists and Communists, and a brutal occupation by Japan. Nevertheless, while there was no shortage of people in China rejecting the claims of the Nationalist Government, internationally no one doubted its legal existence, even when contradicted by facts.

The Cold War had numerous effects on Soviet political transitions and internal affairs, but its impact on Soviet legal doctrine was underestimated and profound. As Hans Kelsen acknowledged: ‘Soviet legal theory adapts itself submissively to every change of the Soviet government’.

But how did Soviet legal doctrine and theory manage this task, and why did the Soviets embrace forms of liberal legalism at the height of the Cold War? This chapter answers the first question by showing how, in order to effect this ‘submission’, Soviet legal doctrine and theory adopted combinations of hard positivism, hermetic monism, indeterminacy in the service of national interest and an extreme liquidity of legislation during the Cold War.