Green New Deals are being widely discussed as both a means to confront climate change and to improve aspects of social well-being. An important facet of the discussion is how they should be financed. The negative impacts of Covid-19 on national budgets and sovereign debt question whether the implementation of Green New Deals is feasible if austerity needs to be introduced to achieve sustainability. This article assesses whether a wealth tax based upon the work of Michal Kalecki could help avoid austerity measures and facilitate the introduction of Green New Deals. While wealth taxes have traditionally been defined on net worth or assets to reduce wealth inequality, the formulation is meant to be equitable by applying to gross wealth or assets. Estimates are calculated for the United States and turn out to be quite modest. The approach not only generates revenue to cover expected net interest outlays on national debt, but additional revenue to pay down portions of it and/or support green initiatives, such as Biden’s de-carbonisation policy. The article concludes with a discussion of challenges for the tax’s effectiveness.

Liberal egalitarians argue that the state is justified in taxing members of a political community to achieve distributive justice and ensure political equality and regime stability. This involves an uneasy compromise between equality and efficiency, a compromise that many argue has recently been undermined by the growth of unchecked wealth and income inequality. This essay argues that there is also a trade-off between selecting fair processes for taxation and aiming for particular distributive outcomes. The way people accumulate wealth, and the way states tax often matters more than distributive outcomes. Policymakers must allow for the fair assessment of tax liabilities, avoid excessive enforcement costs and prevent political actors from using tax systems to achieve their partial ends. Recognizing these considerations justifies a systematic scheme of taxation while constraining the mechanisms for collecting revenue. I justify this position using comparative analysis, which I contrast with the conceptual intuitionistic approach associated with egalitarianism.

Over its entire life, the Internal Revenue Code (like other tax systems) has never tried to tax economic income as such, because of the administrative and liquidity problems that arise from taxing any combination of values consumed and from appreciation (or depreciation) of capital stocks. Instead, the common practice limits tax occasions to a realization of income from sale or other disposition of property. Even then, if the proceeds of the transaction are not cash or marketable securities, as with many corporation reorganizations, taxation is deferred until these assets are converted in cash or marketable securities.

Any effort to eliminate these twin filters by taxing income—and income regardless of realization—will overburden government agencies and private taxpayers, while reducing economic activity. A wealth tax scores even worse by these welfare measures, creating massive problems of evasion and enforcement that will reduce capital formation across the board in the effort to transfer wealth from the ultra-rich to everyone else. A simple tax structure with affordable rates is the only path to economic prosperity.

Over the past decade there have been repeated calls for the greater taxation of wealth. These calls have had little impact on policy. There has been a global trend to reduce or abolish taxes on wealth. The contrast suggests that it may be better now to explore how taxes on wealth may be made a reality rather than designing new tax proposals. What are the barriers to tax wealth? This paper addresses this by conducting a case study of a high profile plan for introducing a one-off wealth tax in the UK. It identifies a tyranny of the status quo, framing and the policy process as key barriers to tax reform. It uses thematic analysis to study how the plans for a one-off wealth tax were discussed in the media and the UK Parliament. This paper argues that there were important shortfalls in both the way the case for a wealth tax was framed as well as the engagement with the policy process. It claims that a stronger framing would have discussed wealth inequality in greater depth and there was a need for a less equivocal case to Parliamentarians.

I investigate a simple continuous-time overlapping generations model with a neoclassical production function. I demonstrate that the degree of wealth inequality is positively related to the difference between the real interest rate r and the growth rate of income g, and if g falls, the r – g gap widens and inequality worsens. I also argue that a wealth tax reduces the wealth inequality. All these results are consistent with the famous predictions advanced by Thomas Piketty in Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014).

This study provides an infinite-horizon model of rational bubbles in a production economy. A bubble can arise when the pursuit of status is modeled explicitly, capturing the notion of “the spirit of capitalism.” Using a parameterized model, I demonstrate the specific conditions for the existence of bubbles and their implications. Bubbles crowd out investment, stimulate consumption, and slow economic growth. I also discuss a stochastic bubble that bursts with an exogenous probability. I show that there could be multiple stochastic bubbly equilibria. Moreover, I suggest that taxing wealth properly can eliminate bubbles and achieve the social optimum.