This chapter tackles two prominent critiques of parliamentary Bills of Rights, namely, that they are thwarted by the Executive dominance of Parliament in Westminster systems, or that parliamentary deliberation about rights is vulnerable to policy distortion and debilitation by the existence of judicial decision making about rights. Charting a course ’from domination to collaboration’, this chapter responds that both these critiques exaggerate the drivers of dominance, with respect to the Executive and especially with respect to the courts. Drawing on recent political science scholarship in Westminster Parliaments, the chapter argues that the Executive is not as dominant and dictatorial as is assumed in popular lore. Moreover, an empirical analysis of political and parliamentary behaviour in the post-HRA era challenges the assertion that the key political actors succumb to a cringing court mimicry. Whilst remaining attentive to the dangers in both directions – i.e. in the direction of Executive aggrandisement or judicial supremacy – this chapter argues that we need to put these threats in perspective. The upshot is a complex picture of constitutional collaboration between powerful political actors, not the straightforward or simple dominance of one over the other.

When we come to think about what a democracy is, and how a nation might go about constructing a democratic government, an election is often the first thing we think is important in that process. While elections do not in themselves guarantee democracy, they are certainly seen as a key element, without which any regime will have a hard time calling itself a democracy. We need to be aware that there are a number of important provisos that allow us to call an election democratic or ‘free and fair’:1. elections are held on a regular basis2. a range of candidates and parties can participate3. as many people as possible can vote freely for the candidate or party of their choice4. a wide range of policies are debated in the public arena5. there is a potential for a change in government at any given election.Elections in Australia generall refer to the elections for the Commonwealth Parliament in Canberra, the state and territory parliaments, and at a local level for the councils and shires. This chapter will explore the nature of those elections, and some of the challenges facing the systems we use.

When we think about parliaments and the legislature, we often find ourselves casting our minds back to the first ‘parliaments’, such as the fora of Ancient Greece or the Althing of Norse Iceland. Broadly speaking they were similar – a group of people coming together to make laws. Parliaments and legislatures have developed considerably since those times to be complex bodies, but the key idea of a group coming together to make laws remains. At the same time we might also think that this collection of people is also somehow representative of democracy – but we need to be clear that just having a legislature does not itself mean you are democratic. A variety of other conditions need to be met before we would usually say that a country is 'democratic', though in the case of Australia this is generally a given. While other chapters will discuss the way parliaments are elected – the electoral system – and who gets to choose who the candidates are – the parties or individuals – this chapter will discuss the role, purpose and operation of the Australian Parliament, as it is the legislature that citizens, members of parliament (MPs) and parties all aim to attend and control.

On 1 January 1901, the newly constituted Australian Parliament met for the first time at the Royal Exhibition Building in Melbourne. This ceremonial meeting of the parliament marked the climax of a ‘federation movement’ that is usually associated with the advocacy of a national system of government.

This chapter explores constitutionalism in the Australian context, as a combination of the written constitution and Westminster practice, before idenitfying key sections of the Australian Constitution. It then proceeds to explore the 1975 constitutional crisis, when the Whitlam government was dismissed. The High Court of Australia's role in interpreting the Australian Constitution is also considered. The chapter concludes by considering the potential for constitutional reform.