Whilst Saudi government decision-making remains ‘top-down’, the dynamic within this approach has shifted as the top-down system incorporates a consultation process that includes newly established civil society institutions alongside recognition that public opinion cannot always be ignored in the new/social media age. Indeed, of particular significance in Saudi Arabia is growing public awareness, particularly amongst young educated Saudis, of the need for government accountability, transparency and best practices. In addition, there have been indications that the Al Saud leadership – to a degree – recognizes the necessity of being answerable to society on domestic policy-making issues that affect citizens’ lives. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to assess perceptions of new media usage, most specifically social media, as well as the importance of public opinion, government transparency and awareness of political issues, and the impact these have on daily life as linked to politico-economic and socio-cultural change in Saudi Arabia.

Since April 2016 a new generation of Saudi leaders led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has transformed the traditional state–society relationship, specifically with the launch of the National Transformation Programme 2020 and Saudi Vision 2030. In turn, this has resulted in the Kingdom’s predominantly youthful, and often well-educated, population re-examining the existing ‘social contract’ at a time of significant socio-economic change. This is because the economics of the social contract have come under increasing strain as a result oil price fluctuations, thereby impacting on Saudi Arabia’s economy, in particular on the related issues of employment, housing and healthcare. With many young male Saudis struggling to enter the domestic labour market and get on the property ladder, it is imperative to examine societal attitudes towards the changing role of economic structures and policies in shaping citizen–state relations – that is, to evaluate the ways in which the existing Saudi social contract is evolving in light of recent economic realities. Moreover, following the 2014 drop in oil price, the Saudi government started to impose fiscal restraint, presenting a significant challenge since its citizens are accustomed to government largesse.

Many young men are frustrated because they feel they are not taken seriously. Many argue forcefully that they want the opportunity to express themselves and be valued as individuals, as well as being given the opportunity to contribute to national development. Indeed, what is the point of the government allocating such a large portion of the budget on education if the youthful population is not going to be heeded and encouraged? If this does not occur then the result will be a waste of the Kingdom’s considerable human capital. Furthermore, if decision-makers believe that young people are in no position to participate in the socio-political and economic processes, then young Saudis will feel that they are being neither listened to nor taken seriously. In contrast, and frustratingly, a young Saudi can get his message across to a global audience through the social media networks that are so widely used. In Saudi Arabia this sense of marginalization can have serious ramifications. Young men bored and frustrated can start getting into fights and driving recklessly or joyriding. This sense of marginalization and boredom is also a contributing factor in increased substance abuse and mental health issues.

In the second decade of the twenty-first century new challenges proliferate, including socioeconomic pressures and regional conflicts. As young Saudi men enter a rapidly changing world, one of the core questions likely to shape the coming decades is the issue of identity. However, national identity remains a contested and complex issue. When I posed the question ‘What is Saudi?’ to my focus groups I was frequently provided with vague definitions or answers with varying degrees of disagreement amongst group members as to what actually constitutes ‘Saudi’. Whilst the majority of young men I surveyed agreed that a Saudi national identity exists, the coherence of this national identity is contested. This chapter discusses the key issue of identity as it relates to national and personal notions of identity, religiosity and generational divides.

Since then-Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman unveiled Saudi Vision 2030 and the National Transformation Programme on 25 April 2016, a great deal of analysis has focused on the potential impact of the Vision at the national level. Prince Mohammed wanted to establish a more direct connection with the young populace, but despite the prince’s strong youth appeal, in reality he is asking more of them: more contributions to the economy, more personal sacrifice for the country. Vision 2030 is a wide-ranging plan to diversify the Kingdom’s economy and reduce oil-dependency, thereby transforming Saudi Arabia’s economic model by making the private sector the engine for growth and jobs. In light of oil price fluctuations since 2014, the Saudi government has attempted to respond to socio-economic pressures. This chapter examines young men’s attitudes to Saudi Vision 2030 and their related hopes and aspirations. It also discusses attitudes to corruption and the introduction of taxation, as well as the desire to participate in national development.

In order to understand contemporary Saudi society, it is imperative to focus on local contexts, particularly as Saudi society is not a homogeneous entity. Local context does not necessarily refer to the Kingdom as a unitary body, but rather to specific constituencies and regional areas. This comprehension of diverse Saudi societies is more nuanced and expansive than the traditional perspective of a relatively homogeneous Saudi society as it allows for a greater variation in the study of young Saudi male perceptions of masculinity, gender relations and marriage in everyday life. This chapter discusses perceptions of masculinity, attitudes to gender relations and the vexing problems of making a ‘good’ marriage as related to accepted Saudi socio-cultural norms. In fact, many young men maintain that a Saudi ‘social dictatorship’ exists, one based on historical socio-tribal attitudes and customs rather than solely Islamic jurisprudence and religious norms. Indeed, there is widespread recognition that these socio-cultural norms frequently govern the way ‘things are supposed to be’ in the community. Failure to follow these accepted practices can lead to family conflict and, significantly, ‘loss of face’ within society.

The Saudi government is educating its young population, with the vast majority attending higher educational institutions in the Kingdom and the brightest students being sent to study overseas, sponsored by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ Overseas Scholarship Programme – better known in the West as the King Abdullah Scholarship Programme (KASP). In fact, it was the leaders of the Kingdom’s universities, rectors and senior supporting personnel, who convinced the Saudi government to transform the Kingdom into a knowledge-based economy and, by extension, society, by utilizing its considerable resources to better educate and build its human capital. This chapter discusses young men’s opinions of the education system and the degree to which it prepares them for tertiary education and employment. The chapter also looks at the extent of societal transformation in Saudi Arabia, as well as the impact of globalization on Saudi society.