Temporal nihilism is the view that our lives will not matter after we die. According to the standard interpretation, this is because our lives will not make a permanent difference. Many who consider the view thus reject it by denying that our lives need to have an eternal impact. However, in this essay, I develop a different formulation of temporal nihilism revolving around the persistence of personal value itself. According to this more powerful conception of nihilism, we do not have personal value after death, so our past life no longer has well-being after we die. The standard objections to the standard interpretation do not apply to this more nihilistic nihilism. I offer a new response according to which personal value persists after death because the person continues to exist.

Parfit denies that the introduction of reasons into our ontology is costly for his theory. He puts forth two positions to help establish the claim: the Plural Senses View and the Argument from Empty Ontology. I argue that, first, the Plural Senses View for ‘exists’ can be expanded to allow for senses which undermine his ontological claims; second, the Argument from Empty Ontology can be debunked by Platonists. Furthermore, it is difficult to make statements about reasons true unless these statements include reference to objects in reality. These arguments show the instability of Parfit’s claimed metaethical advantages over naturalism.