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The aspirations to autonomy, independence, and equality that had so effectively boosted the discourse of modern dominium were never realized. The rationalization and expansion of the economy generated enormous wealth inequalities between the propertied classes and the large class of propertyless wage laborers. The latter experienced oppression rather than autonomy, material dependence rather than the independence, and exclusion instead of equality. The “social question” prompted social reformers of all stripes to interrogate the role of property law (in the emergent industrial world. The new political and intellectual climate ushered in by the “social question” transformed the ideological discourse about property, the concerns of the jurists, and, to an extent, the doctrines of law of property. Alternative conceptualizations of property focused on social relations, redistribution and cooperation, started appearing in the writings of philosophers, economists and pamphleteers. And a new generation of jurists, interested in functionalist and consequence-based approach to property, gained power in law faculties around Europe, Latin America and beyond.
The trust can be an instrument of great power and influence in managing and maintaining wealth and creating vital rights and obligations. Settlors are given significant freedom as to when and how they create a trust, with few restrictions on the provisions they can include in the trust instrument. But with this conspicuous freedom comes responsibility to ensure that the trust is not abused. Equity will not allow such abuse, and if a trust is considered to have been abused, it may be void or unenforceable. But when will a trust be considered to be abused? Surprisingly, little attention has been paid by commentators or judges to the notion of abuse of trust, although there are particular doctrines that can be analysed as being triggered by an abuse of trust, which have received a significant amount of attention. These include the doctrine of sham trust, illusory trust, defrauding creditors, illegality and fraud on the power. All of these doctrines are examined, common principles are identified and the chapter concludes that it is possible to synthesise from these doctrines a distinct doctrine of abuse of trust which should be expressly recognised.
Chapter 3 examines the general rules of international law that apply in disputed maritime areas. First, it focuses on the possibility of whether a conflict arising in disputed maritime areas can come to threaten international peace and security. Coastal States have approached the UN Security Council on a number of occasions, seeking declarations from it to the effect that as a result of unilateral conduct in disputed areas, a situation had arisen which met the threshold of that international peace and security was put in jeopardy. Further, other relevant general rules under international law, some of which by their nature are related to the treaty obligation of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) LOSC not to hamper or jeopardise (e.g. not aggravating or extending a dispute and the prohibition on abuse of rights), and their status (e.g. are they customary international law rules?) as well as their applicability to disputed maritime areas are explored. The chapter also discusses the possibility of engaging international responsibility, if certain unilateral activities that have been undertaken in disputed areas resulted in a breach of international law.
The chapter tries to establish a systematic framework which allows us to structure the examination of human rights cases by indicating the necessary legal components and putting these elements in their proper place and in context to each other. Substantive human rights guarantees as, e.g., enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention, cannot be fully understood without taking account of their explicit or implicit limitations; only together do they form the basis for their successful invocation. Therefore the legal limits of and restrictions to human rights as well as the limitations drawn to the use of restrictions, as particularly the principle of proportionality, are discussed. Primacy of freedom, (strict) interpretation, balancing of rights, absolute rights, margin of appreciation and derogation from human rights are other issues that have to be dealt with in the given context.
Before arbitration tribunals can decide on the merits of a case, they must first appraise whether they have jurisdiction to hear it. The establishment of jurisdiction is a complex exercise that raises numerous legal issues. To make sense of this, Chapter 14 first explains the relevant fundamental notions and principles that govern the matter and examines how jurisdiction is formally appraised. From a substantive point of view, it then delves into the key aspects and issues of jurisdiction and admissibility based on a close analysis of treaty and arbitration practices. More specifically, it examines in turn (1) the offer to arbitrate; (2) the notion and definition of ‘investment’; (3) the notion and definition of ‘investor’; and (4) the impact of investors’ conduct on jurisdiction and admissibility.
Everyone condemns what they perceive as 'abuse of rights', and some would elevate it to a general principle of law. But the notion seldom suffices to be applied as a rule of decision. When adjudicators purport to do so they expose themselves to charges of unpredictability, if not arbitrariness. After examining the dissimilar origins and justification of the notion in national and international doctrine, and the difficulty of its application in both comparative and international law, this book concludes that except when given context as part of a lex specialis, it is too nebulous to serve as a general principle of international law.
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