Administrative tribunal judges determine rights and entitlements regarding bureaucratic decisions. In immigration appeal cases, they review negative decisions of permanent residency acquisition and family reunification. Based on an analysis of all immigration appeal decisions in Canada’s Quebec province over a period of twenty-three years, we find that tribunal judges confirm the bureaucratic decision in the vast majority of cases, noting the migrants’ inability to meet the annual income requirements, and rarely reverse the decision in favour of migrants. Documenting the marginal contribution of tribunal judges to promoting administrative justice, this article contributes to the debate on whether and how courts can advance immigrants’ rights.

In recent years, it has become common to see claims that the doctrine of legitimate expectations has no sufficiently defined purpose, and that administrative law scholars should do more theoretical work to bring coherence to this area of law. In this paper, I suggest this ‘conceptual critique’ of legitimate expectations is misplaced and that, instead, it reveals a much wider failing of contemporary administrative law scholarship. First, I show how there has not yet been, and is unlikely to be, a satisfactory answer to the conceptual critique. Following on from this premise, I suggest that the assumptions underlying the conceptual critique are faulty and, administrative lawyers need to fundamentally alter and expand how they study legitimate expectations. The aim now, I argue, must be to move towards providing an account of the practice of legitimate expectations in the wider context of public administration. My specific argument in this paper is thus a case for a significant reorientation and an expansion of the study of how law protects legitimate expectations, but the wider suggestion is that the same shift is required in administrative law scholarship generally.

The wording of article 47 of Kenya's Constitution of 2010 is almost identical to that of the section 33 rights to just administrative action in South Africa's 1996 Constitution. Like section 33, article 47 mandates the enactment of legislation to give effect to these constitutional rights, and Kenya's Fair Administrative Action Act 4 of 2015 was strongly influenced by the equivalent South African legislation, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). South Africa can thus be regarded as a sort of laboratory for Kenyan administrative justice. The aim of this article is to highlight some of the South African experience in relation to section 33 and the PAJA in the hope that Kenya will learn from some of South Africa's mistakes. It argues that the Kenyan courts should avoid following the example of their South African counterparts in allowing their mandated legislation to become almost redundant.