Most US lawsuits involving Chinese companies are initiated by or against their customers, employees, or business counterparts. However, on occasion, Chinese investors may go to court against a US government entity to resolve a dispute. As US–China relations continue to deteriorate, Chinese companies are increasingly caught in the crossfire of the geopolitical rivalry. Being suspected as agents for the Chinese state, China-headquartered multinational companies, especially those with ties to the Chinese government, have expressed growing frustration over what they perceive as unfair treatment by the US government. This chapter examines the legal reactions of Chinese companies to perceived official bias in the United States in the context of intensifying geopolitical tensions.

Chapter 10 studies judicial review, widely known as administrative litigation in China, under the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) (2017), which was first enacted in 1989. The command-and-control approach to pollution control grants wide-ranging powers to administrative agencies. They set standards, monitor performance and impose sanctions. Their acts or omissions directly determine the effectiveness of the environmental legal regime. Judicial review allows courts to check agency behavior to ensure good governance in pollution control and long-term sustainable development. While ALL (1989) has laid down the legal basis for injured parties to sue against unlawful agency acts or omissions, there have been tremendous obstacles for private parties to gain access to courts. The Law was amended in 2014 and 2017 to relax the statutory requirement on standing and expand the scope of judicial review. The chapter examines the issue of standing, the scope of judicial review, and judicial remedies. It concludes with discussion of the special challenges of administrative litigation in China.

This chapter examines the courts and jurisprudence under the Yusin Constitution.In his book on the “dual state” in Nazi Germany, Fraenkel showed how the prerogative state in the public law realm could coexist with the normative state in the private law realm. Fraenkel’s dual state theory offers important insight for the judicial process in Yusin Korea. Even with the existence of the emergency military courts, the regular justice system, criminal and civil, continued to function. In this situation, it was critical for the courts to maintain the ordinary business of the law, especially as long as the regime’s concern for legitimacy still committed it to at least a semblance of legality and judicial independence. The first part of the chapter discusses security cases, and the second part nonsecurity cases. In the height of the institutionalized arbitrariness of emergency rule, there were flourishing and sound jurisprudential activities taking place.