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Despite the Western Front’s reputation for stagnation, the armies there strove for tactical, technological and organisational advantage. Learning was the fourth command task, and the chapter describes both how and what the German army learned about combined arms battle, the key to tactical success. By mid-1916, it had fallen behind the enemy. Evolution of doctrine to remedy this, resistance to it and measures to overcome the resistance. Case study on converting the doctrine into reality by training of command teams and formations.
Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of German combined arms performance in the spring fighting. Different lessons learned and OHL’s more directive approach when updating doctrine to prevent chaos. Positive reputation of the doctrine but important tactical defects persisted. Strong evidence from this period both for and against the German army as a learning organisation: this ambivalence an important cause of uneven success converting learning into improved performance.
The blackout in North America of August 2003 was one of the worst on record. It affected eight United States states and parts of Canada for >24 hours. Additionally, two large United States cities, Detroit, Michigan and Cleveland, Ohio, suffered from a loss of water pressure and a subsequent ban on the use of public supplies of potable water that lasted four days. A literature review revealed a paucity of literature that describes blackouts and how they may affect the medical community.
Methods:
This paper includes a review of after-action reports from four inner-city, urban hospitals supplemented accounts from the authors' hospital's emergency operations center (emergency operations center).
Results:
Some of the problems encountered, included: (1)lighting; (2) elevator operations; (3) supplies of water; (4) communication operations; (5) computer failure; (6) lack of adequate supplies of food; (7) mobility to obtain Xray studies; (8) heating, air condition, and ventilation; (9) staffing; (10) pharmacy; (11) registration of patients; (12) hospital emergency operations center; (13) loss of isolation facilities; (14) inadequate supplies of paper; (15) impaired ability to provide care for non-emergency patients; (16) sanitation; and (17) inadequate emergency power.
Discussion:
The blackout of 2003 uncovered problems within the United States hospital system, ranging from staffing to generator coverage. This report is a review of the effects that the blackout and water ban of 2003 had on hospitals in a large inner-city area. Also discussed are solutions utilized at the time and recommendations for the future.
Conclusion:
The blackout of 2003 was an excellent test of disaster/emergency planning, and produced many valuable lessons to be used in future events.
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