Chapter 2 presents a statement of the book’s theory. The geography and demography of the post-Soviet space suggests a strategic game with three actors, all second-guessing each others strategies: peripheral elites in Russian-speaking communities, “national” elites in the capital, and elites in the Kremlin. The output of bargaining processes is the distribution of symbolic cultural goods. The game is played in two stages. In the first, inside Russian-speaking communities, elites attempt to coordinate to threaten to secede, or not. In the second stage, bargaining takes place between the capital and the potentially seditious community. If bargaining breaks down, the Russian government might intervene. We outline the analytic narrative structure that organizes the remainder of the book. The theory is formalized in a mathematical appendix (Appendix A).

Margaret Levi and Barry Weingast focus on a particular type of case in which the subject is an outcome that results from strategic interaction, when one person’s decision depends on what another does. “A weakness of case studies per se is that there typically exist multiple ways to interpret a given case,” they begin. “How are we to know which interpretation makes most sense? What gives us confidence in the particular interpretation offered?” An analytic narrative first elucidates the principal players, their preferences, key decision points and possible choices, and the rules of the game. It then builds a model of the sequence of interaction including predicted outcomes and evaluates the model through comparative statics and the testable implications the mode generates. Most analytic narratives model situations as extensive form games. However, although game theory is useful, there is no hard rule that requires us to formalize. In this kind of case study, the findings do not generalize to other contexts, but instead point to the characteristics of situations to which a similar strategic logic applies.