Money pushes sports to extremes. As the rewards for success grow, so does the pressure, with sportspeople pushing themselves ever harder. In equestrian sports, this can mean pushing the horse as well, too often to the point of abuse. This article discusses the beautiful side of equestrianism as well as its darker side, which is a bitter reality for many competition horses. It sets out a comparison of legal standards for equine animal welfare (at the level of international law, EU law and national laws) as well as those coming from sports laws. It also examines dependencies between animal protection rules under EU law and animal protection rules under the laws of individual EU Member States concerning equestrian sports. It aims to answer the questions of whether equestrian sports constitute a general exemption to their being considered animal abuse and on what grounds this exemption might be changed in the future.

This article examines the ways in which the language of legal rights is invoked by those seeking to improve the treatment of animals. Drawing from a range of analytical, realist, and critical legal and social theorists, it argues that certain argumentative techniques commonly employed to justify the extension of legal rights to animals may serve to strengthen and reproduce the very forms of exploitation they seek to challenge. The article begins by identifying and critiquing the binary characterisation of rights/welfare and property/personality in liberal animal law scholarship. It then employs the insights of Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin to expose and critique various appeals to an ‘exterior’ or ‘extra-legal’ domain which functions to stabilise the meaning of these doctrinal categories. In doing so, it explores the strategic viability of rights discourse in the animal advocacy movement with a view to highlighting the limitations of liberal constructions of animal rights.

Belarus willingly uses migrants as a tool for political pressure, sending them into forests bordering the EU. This prompted Poland to secure its territory with additional troops and, first, to build a razor wire fence, and, second, to build an entire wall made of steel and concrete. The humanitarian situation of migrants stuck in the Białowieża forest has been dire. An underexposed theme is how not only people were hurt by the border policies, but non-human animals were also affected. As the effects of fencing ‘fortress Europe’ on wildlife are widespread (spatial behaviour, movements and gene flow), this paper uses the Polish–Belarusian border as a case study of a conflict between human border policies and non-human interests. We argue that the plans for the Polish wall are illegal, politically unjust and unethical, also from a more-than-human perspective. The wall is illegal because requirements under EU environmental law, in particular Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, were not met. The wall is unjust because it painfully demonstrates how animals’ communal or even liminal status is far from being recognised. Finally, the wall is unethical because it fails to account for the vulnerability of both humans and non-humans.

Animal protection laws exist at federal, provincial and municipal levels in Canada, with enforcement agencies relying largely upon citizens to report concerns. Existing research about animal protection law focuses on general approaches to enforcement and how legal terms function in the courts, but the actual work processes of animal law enforcement have received little study. We used institutional ethnography to explore the everyday work of Call Centre operators and Animal Protection Officers, and we map how this work is organised by laws and institutional polices. When receiving and responding to calls staff try to identify evidence of animal ‘distress’ as legally defined, because various interventions (writing orders, seizing animals) then become possible. However, many cases, such as animals living in deprived or isolated situations, fall short of constituting ‘distress’ and the legally mandated interventions cannot be used. Officers are also constrained by privacy and property law and by the need to record attempts to secure compliance in order to justify further action including obtaining search warrants. As a result, beneficial intervention can be delayed or prevented. Officers sometimes work strategically to advocate for animals when the available legal tools cannot resolve problems. Recommendations arising from this research include expanding the legal definition of ‘distress’ to better fit animals’ needs, developing ways for officers to intervene in a broader range of situations, and more ethnographic research on enforcement work in jurisdictions with different legal systems to better understand how animal protection work is organised and constrained by laws and policies.

This paper will ask whether the legal status presently afforded to nonhuman animals ought to influence regulatory debates concerning human cerebral organoids. The New York Courts recently refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus to Happy the Elephant as she was property rather than a legal person while at the same time accepting that she is a moral patient deserving of rights protection. An undesirable situation has therefore arisen in which the law holds a being with moral status to be incapable of benefitting from legal redress due to their legal status as property.

The author argues that this is something that we ought to avoid when designing the regulatory framework which will govern the use of human cerebral organoids. Yet, a difference exists in that, whereas the judges already accept Happy is a moral patient, there is presently no consensus around the moral status of organoids. This paper will consider whether human cerebral organoids have passed the moral threshold of sentience. If they have, or are close to doing so, regulators ought to consider their legal status in advance so as to ensure that adequate limitations are placed on this usage so as to avoid unethical practices.

Today, there are a dozen labelling schemes pertaining to farm animal welfare in at least seven Member States. Despite the proliferation of animal welfare labels, European Union rules on food information to consumers concerning the treatment of farmed animals used in animal-source food production remain fragmented and incomplete. On the one hand, the rules contained in agricultural regulations primarily aim to harmonise marketing standards, but only for some products. On the other hand, consumer protection rules aim to protect consumers from misleading commercial claims but not misleading claims about animal treatment specifically. After examining the situation that has led to the proliferation of animal welfare food labels in the European Union, this article analyses the animal welfare food labelling landscape and presents different regulatory pathways to best harmonise consumer information on farm animal welfare.

It is sometimes assumed that, in order for animals to be adequately protected by the legal system, their status first needs to change from property to person in one fell swoop. Legal personhood is perceived as the necessary requirement for animals to possess legal rights and become visible in law, distinguished from legal things. In this article I propose an alternative approach to animal legal personhood, which construes the road towards it as a gradual transition rather than a revolution. According to this alternative approach, animals become increasingly visible in law when their existing simple rights are shaped to function more like the rights of humans. Instead of a condition for the possession of rights, legal personhood should then be regarded as a (potential) consequence of growing animal rights.

Global animal law has emerged as a new legal subdiscipline and area of study following the widespread proliferation of animal law and animal law studies across the globe. However, there remains confusion as to what exactly global animal law is. Early global animal law studies are also entrenching norms that facilitate coloniality and neglect intersecting oppressions. In response, this article proposes a conception of global animal law based in global law metatheory and second wave animal ethics. This article critically analyses instances of “globabble” within global animal law, where global-speak has masked ethnocentric, western influence, and bias. This article recommends diversifying and decolonizing global animal law, relabelling some such work as western/European perspectives on animals and international law. It also recommends focusing on deep, critical, and radical animal justice in lieu of welfarism or rights-based theory. The article argues this could inspire a more interconnected, post-Westphalian, multilateral global animal lawscape.

Globalization now exerts an enormous impact on the human/animal relationship, which has momentous implications for both animal advocacy and the future of animal law. Animal abuse is being outsourced as animal experimentation heads east and agricultural animal production moves south. As a result of, among other things, outsourcing and other impacts of globalization on the industries of animal experimentation and animal agricultural production, parochialism and ‘one state’ strategies will not ultimately be effective in ending animal abuse. Animal advocates and lawyers must therefore construct theories, strategies, principles and campaigns that have resonance around the globe and traverse seemingly impenetrable cultural divides. To accomplish this crossing of cultural boundaries, it is paramount to fashion a common language – one which expresses cross-culturally accepted universal principles. This article proposes a methodology for generating these universal principles for animal advocacy and legal policy proposals, loosely based on Feminist Care Theory, positing that moral principles are based on feelings of compassion, sympathy and empathy. The specific basal notion proposed for grounding these universal principles for animal advocacy and legal policy proposals is the concept of ‘caring’, defined as ‘the suite of feelings and cognitions that an emotionally sound human experiences in response to focusing attention on the suffering of others’. Based on this foundational notion, several examples of uses of animals are analyzed and exemplar universal principles and legal policy proposals are derived.