The use of animals as scientific models is argued to be crucial for producing new scientific and medical knowledge and clinical treatments. However, animal research continues to raise socio-ethical concerns. In recent years, there has been a push for openness amongst the life science community, with the aim of increasing the transparency of animal research to wider publics. Yet, how this push for openness is experienced by those responsible for the care and welfare of research animals requires further study. This paper draws upon qualitative interviews with Named Veterinary Surgeons (NVS) in the UK and explores how they practise openness, avoid openness, and, at times, challenge the way their role is represented within openness agendas. Overall, this social scientific analysis reveals that the current openness agenda has the potential to create tensions for professionals, as they seek to manage regulatory and public imaginaries of the veterinary identity alongside the animal research controversy. The paper concludes by arguing for a culture of dialogue, where openness includes allowing those with responsibilities for animal welfare to express ambivalence or concern about their own role. Finally, the paper calls for sustained academic work on relations between the veterinary profession and wider society, particularly areas that involve contested practices in which care and harm may coincide.

Animal experimentation raises value conflicts between animal protection and other goods, such as freedom of inquiry or health and safety. If governments can phase out the practice by non-prohibitive incentive-setting, the pro tanto moral rationale for doing so is obvious. So why should they not? This article first sketches a fictional scenario in which a government adopts a phase-out plan for animal experimentation. It then considers two moral objections to this plan: First, the plan unduly restricts freedom of inquiry, and second, it merely displaces animal experimentation across borders and thus fails to reduce animal suffering. Both arguments are refined premise by premise to articulate their strongest versions. The two objections can help to narrow down desiderata for good phase-out plans. However, they do not provide a compelling case against phase-out planning as such because they miss its incremental and constructive nature. Unless better arguments can be provided, it appears that government inaction on phasing out animal experimentation lacks moral justification.

The generation of three-dimensional cerebral organoids from human-induced pluripotent stem cells (hPSC) has facilitated the investigation of mechanisms underlying several neuropsychiatric disorders, including stress-related disorders, namely major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. Generating hPSC-derived neurons, cerebral organoids, and even assembloids (or multi-organoid complexes) can facilitate research into biomarkers for stress susceptibility or resilience and may even bring about advances in personalized medicine and biomarker research for stress-related psychiatric disorders. Nevertheless, cerebral organoid research does not come without its own set of ethical considerations. With increased complexity and resemblance to in vivo conditions, discussions of increased moral status for these models are ongoing, including questions about sentience, consciousness, moral status, donor protection, and chimeras. There are, however, unique ethical considerations that arise and are worth looking into in the context of research into stress and stress-related disorders using cerebral organoids. This paper provides stress research-specific ethical considerations in the context of cerebral organoid generation and use for research purposes. The use of stress research as a case study here can help inform other practices of in vitro studies using brain models with high ethical considerations.

The basic tenet of the Australian Code of Practice for the Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes (the Code) is that there is an ethical imperative in our decisions as to if and how animals are used in these circumstances. The Code provides a framework for ethical review which incorporates a set of guiding principles and establishes institutional Animal Ethics Committees with responsibilities for oversight of these activities; the nexus between animal welfare and scientific outcomes and the recognition that such ethical decisions are not matters for the scientific community alone but must involve the wider community are notions central to the effective implementation of the Code. The Code identifies the responsibilities of the parties involved such that arrangements within which individuals exercise their responsibilities are clarified and processes for accountability are transparent. First published in 1969 as an initiative of the scientific community under the auspices of the National Health and Medical Research Council, the seventh edition of the Code was published in 2004. The Code is a living document with changing community views and scientific developments reflected in each revision. The time course of the development of the Code provides a background to examine the way in which policies governing the use of animals for scientific purposes have evolved in Australia. This paper will provide an overview of these developments and discuss the influences which have shaped the key elements of this approach.

The purpose of this article is to show that animal rights are not necessarily at odds with the use of animals for research. If animals hold basic moral rights similar to those of humans, then we should consequently extend the ethical requirements guiding research with humans to research with animals. The article spells out how this can be done in practice by applying the seven requirements for ethical research with humans proposed by Ezekiel Emanuel, David Wendler, and Christine Grady to animal research. These requirements are (1) social value, (2) scientific validity, (3) independent review, (4) fair subject selection, (5) favorable risk–benefit ratio, (6) informed consent, and (7) respect for research subjects. In practice, this means that we must reform the practice of animal research to make it more similar to research with humans, rather than completely abolish the former. Indeed, if we ban animal research altogether, then we would also deprive animals of its potential benefits—which would be ethically problematic.

In 1966, Henry K. Beecher published an article entitled “Ethics and Clinical Research” in the New England Journal of Medicine, which cited examples of ethically problematic human research. His influential paper drew attention to common moral problems such as inadequate attention to informed consent, risks, and efforts to provide ethical justification. Beecher’s paper provoked significant advancements in human research policies and practices. In this paper, we use an approach modeled after Beecher’s 1966 paper to show that moral problems with animal research are similar to the problems Beecher described for human research. We describe cases that illustrate ethical deficiencies in the conduct of animal research, including inattention to the issue of consent or assent, incomplete surveys of the harms caused by specific protocols, inequitable burdens on research subjects in the absence of benefits to them, and insufficient efforts to provide ethical justification. We provide a set of recommendations to begin to address these deficits.

In this article, we present three necessary conditions for morally responsible animal research that we believe people on both sides of this debate can accept. Specifically, we argue that, even if human beings have higher moral status than nonhuman animals, animal research is morally permissible only if it satisfies (1) an expectation of sufficient net benefit, (2) a worthwhile-life condition, and (3) a no-unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition. We then claim that, whether or not these necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for justified animal research, they are relatively demanding, with the consequence that many animal experiments may fail to satisfy them.

Nonhuman animal (“animal”) experimentation is typically defended by arguments that it is reliable, that animals provide sufficiently good models of human biology and diseases to yield relevant information, and that, consequently, its use provides major human health benefits. I demonstrate that a growing body of scientific literature critically assessing the validity of animal experimentation generally (and animal modeling specifically) raises important concerns about its reliability and predictive value for human outcomes and for understanding human physiology. The unreliability of animal experimentation across a wide range of areas undermines scientific arguments in favor of the practice. Additionally, I show how animal experimentation often significantly harms humans through misleading safety studies, potential abandonment of effective therapeutics, and direction of resources away from more effective testing methods. The resulting evidence suggests that the collective harms and costs to humans from animal experimentation outweigh potential benefits and that resources would be better invested in developing human-based testing methods.

The control of risk and harm in human research often calls for the establishment of upper limits of risk of pain, suffering, and distress that investigators must not exceed. Such upper limits are uncommon in animal research, in which limits of acceptability are usually left to the discretion of individual investigators, institutions, national inspectors, or ethics review committees. We here assess the merits of the European Directive 2010/63/EU on the Protection of Animals Used for Scientific Purposes and its accompanying instruments, such as guides and examples. These documents present a body of legislation governing animal research in the European Union. We argue that the directive supplies a promising approach, but one in need of revision. We interpret the directive’s general conception of upper limits and show its promise for the establishment of high-quality policies. We provide a moral rationale for such policies, address the problem of justified exceptions to established upper limits, and show when causing harm is and is not wrongful. We conclude that if the standards we propose for improving the directive are not realized in the review of research protocols, loose and prejudicial risk-benefit assessments may continue to be deemed sufficient to justify morally questionable research. However, a revised EU directive and accompanying instruments could have a substantial influence on the ethics of animal research worldwide, especially in the development of morally sound legal frameworks.

This article provides an overview of the six other contributions in the Neuroethics and Animals special section. In addition, it discusses the methodological and theoretical problems of interdisciplinary fields. The article suggests that interdisciplinary approaches without established methodological and theoretical bases are difficult to assess scientifically. This might cause these fields to expand without actually advancing.