China has initiated three antidumping (AD) investigations against US feed products since 2010, despite clear mutual benefits from such exports from the US to China. This article provides a close examination of these investigations, what prompted them, how they were resolved, and the costs they imposed on importers and exporters. The article also describes the political economy around these investigations and how China's antidumping laws provide it with flexibility to manage these investigations. The article concludes that this flexibility makes China well-positioned to continue using AD investigations against some trade partners in the future, particularly if AD use continues to rise globally.

Why do firms demand antidumping protectionism? Contemporary literature highlights a plethora of causal mechanisms within the data-generating process, including retaliatory motives, exchange rate appreciations, business cycles, and deindustrialization. I argue that countries that are economically integrated into global markets should be associated with less demand for antidumping trade remedies. In particular, countries with higher levels of trade and financial flows should receive fewer petitions for antidumping trade remedies from firms overall, ceteris paribus. I test this theoretical argument with a series of de facto globalization indicators collected from thirty-three countries between 1978 and 2022, finding support for these arguments.

The UK's Trade Remedies Authority (TRA) conducts economic assessments of the ramifications of trade remedies, the Economic Interest Test (EIT). Such assessments are not mandated by the World Trade Organization but are conducted by certain trade remedy investigating authorities, including those of Brazil, Canada, the European Union, and New Zealand. The EIT is a mandatory part of the UK trade remedy system and is arguably more transparent than similar interest tests conducted by other trade remedy investigating authorities. However, stakeholder participation remains a challenge and the TRA is working on ways to improve participation. To date, the TRA has completed 11 EITs in its trade remedy cases, with a further ten live cases. These cases cover different products, markets, and countries, across which the likely positive and negative impacts of trade remedy differ. This paper invites experts to review the TRA's EIT methodology.

Unhappy with the rulings of the WTO dispute settlement system, which disproportionately targeted US use of trade remedies, the United States ended the entire system in 2019. There are multiple hurdles to agreeing to new terms of trade remedy use and thus potentially restoring some form of binding dispute settlement. First, a change would affect access to policy flexibility by the now large number of users of trade remedies. Second, although China's exports are the overwhelming target of trade remedies, exporters in other countries increasingly find themselves caught up in trade remedy actions linked to China. Third, critical differences posed by China's economic model may call for new rules for trade remedies, but no consensus on those rules has emerged. Even some of the most promising reforms have practical limitations, create additional challenges, or may be politically unviable.

The stalling of WTO multilateralism and the proliferation of preferential trade agreements in recent decades have drawn substantial attention to the impacts of preferential liberalization. A critical question is how they affect the trade barriers imposed against outsiders. I examine the relationship between preferential trade liberalization and protection against non-member countries by testing the predictions of a political–economy model based on the previous literature. Focusing on a specific model allows me to uncover the mechanisms via which preferential liberalization affects external import protection, whereas most of the existing literature has focused on establishing the sign of the effect only. Furthermore, I focus on not only tariffs, as most studies do, but also on the temporary trade barriers of antidumping and safeguards. I test the predictions for Latin America and obtain results that provide solid evidence supporting two mechanisms from the theory, which lead to lower protection against non-members of a preferential trade agreement. First, a lower preferential import protection level means that the increase in preferential imports from increasing the external tariff creates a smaller increase in tariff revenue. Second, as preferential import protection is cut, there is a decrease in the markup and sales of domestic firms, and thus raising the external import protection generates less profit. Moreover, this second effect is present when the political motivation of the government is sufficiently strong.

This paper presents a legal-economic analysis of the World Trade Organization's Article 22.6 arbitration report on the dispute over certain United States’ antidumping methodologies. The Arbitrator sought to quantify the damages suffered by China due to US non-compliance with an earlier ruling. The case covered 25 antidumping duty determinations for which at least one of three methodologies (weighted average-to-transaction; single rate presumption; and zeroing) was incorrectly applied. Damage calculations rely heavily on how the counterfactual is defined – what would have been the duty had it not been for the inconsistent measures? The Arbitrator deemed a zero-duty counterfactual to be appropriate, but the justifications were in our view weak and illustrate the danger of an Arbitrator essentially performing re-litigation of violations that may or may not have occurred in the administrative investigations. We conclude that the Arbitrator may have gone above and beyond its mandate in this determination.

Typically, the WTO Arbitrator, when charged with evaluating the permissible level of countermeasures (suspension of concessions), has chosen a counterfactual state of the world where the challenged (illegal) measure has not been adopted at all. The Arbitrator then would calculate the trade lost because of the adopted (illegal) measure, and thus, decide on the level of permissible countermeasures. In US–Washing Machines (Article 22.6-US), deviating from this custom, the Arbitrator adopted a different counterfactual, assuming that the complainant had adopted a different, ‘reasonable’ measure. The Arbitrator then evaluated the trade lost based on the distance between the adopted (illegal) and the ‘reasonable’ measure and calculated the level of countermeasures. In this paper, we explain the multitude of perils facing dispute settlement if this approach is adopted in future disputes. We also advance a few thoughts on rethinking the workings of the Arbitrator when measuring the level of permissible countermeasures, since similar slippery slopes risk being reproduced in future cases.

Current explanations of demand for anti-dumping protections focus on the role of the business cycle, and fluctuations in real exchange rates. However, empirical evidence supporting these explanations is based primarily on the experience of industrialized countries. Here, we examine anti-dumping petitions in a broader sample of thirty-four industrialized and middle income countries from 1978–2015. We also propose a new determinant of demand for anti-dumping petitions—changes in the pattern of industrial production between developed and developing economies over this period have contributed to deindustrialization in advanced economies and premature industrialization some developing countries. These changes threaten established industries and motivate them to demand protection.

The ‘new NAFTA’ agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States maintained the system for binational panel judicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations of domestic government agencies. In US–Mexico disputes, this hybrid system brings together Spanish and English-speaking lawyers from the civil and the common law to solve legal disputes applying domestic law. These panels raise issues regarding potential bicultural, bilingual, and bijural (mis)understandings in legal reasoning. Do differences in language, legal traditions, and legal cultures limit the effectiveness of inter-systemic dispute resolution? We analyze all of the decisions of NAFTA panels in US–Mexico disputes regarding Mexican antidumping and countervailing duty determinations and the profiles of the corresponding panelists. This case study tests whether one can actually comprehend the ‘other’. To what extent can a common law, English-speaking lawyer understand and apply Mexican law, expressed in Spanish and rooted in a distinct legal culture?

The main aim is to question why we don't see more firms petitioning for import relief. It is well accepted that petitioning itself can restrain imports, lead to higher prices and hence higher profits (in the short run). What prevents more firms from filing for protection? It may be that petitioning reflects cost inefficiency on the part of the petitioning firm, and concerns about revealing this information might act as a deterrent for firms to come forward with their complaints. However, in a declining industry where a large number of firms are contemplating exit, petitioning could be a signal that the firm expects to remain in the market for the near future. The signaling hypothesis is tested by comparing the stock market response of an antidumping petition for petitioning firms and non-petitioning firms producing the same product.

U.S. growers filed an antidumping case against Canadian growers of greenhouse-grown tomatoes, alleging that U.S. growers were being injured, or threatened with material injury, by imports from Canada. The U.S. Department of Commerce determined that imports of greenhouse-grown tomatoes were being sold in U.S. markets at less than fair market value. The U.S. International Trade Commission determined the “like product” to be all fresh market tomatoes, concluding the domestic industry was not materially injured. Anecdotal evidence used by the Commission Department in determining like product ignores the wealth of knowledge that economics can add. An economic model is proposed for purposes of determining like product.

The market of wooden beds in the U.S. has been flooded with imports from China and Vietnam in recent years. Static and dynamic Almost Ideal Demand System models are used to assess the import demand for wooden beds from the top seven supplying countries. The analyses reveal that the antidumping investigation on China has some temporary trade depression effect on China, but trade diversion occurs to Vietnam, Indonesia, Canada, and Brazil. The formal implementation of antidumping duties since 2005 has not shown any significant effect on the trade pattern. U.S. consumers spend more on beds from newly industrialized countries and there are moderate degrees of substitution among wooden beds from most countries.

Why have China's petrochemical and steel industries behaved so differently in seeking trade protection through antidumping measures, especially given that both industries face the full force of the global economy? We argue that the patterning of antidumping actions is best explained in terms of industrial structures, inclusive of degrees of horizontal concentration and vertical integration. These structures determine a firm's motivation to seek protection as well as its capacity to overcome collective action problems within its industry. In the petrochemical industry, the shift toward greater horizontal consolidation and vertical integration reduces the collective action problems associated with antidumping petitions among upstream companies. It also weakens downstream companies lobbying in favor of the general protection of highly integrated conglomerates. In the steel industry, by contrast, national industrial policy fails to weaken local state interests sufficiently. Fragmented upstream and downstream channels instead persist, with strong odds against upstream suppliers waging a successful defense of material interests. Such distinctive industrial structures, we show, were a direct result of whether the central government could restructure these designated priority industries in its preferred direction. We find that exogenous price shocks proved particularly helpful in this regard.