SmileDirectClub markets, manufactures, and delivers clear plastic dental aligners directly to the consumer: no dental office necessary. This well-known business strategy—cut costs by cutting out the middleman—has in several instances caught the attention of state dental regulators. While the dental boards consider some of SmileDirectClub’s practices to be violative of state dental practice law, the corporation has fought back in federal court, charging dental regulators with antitrust violations and with denying SmileDirectClub its constitutional rights.

The Supreme Court, as noted by SmileDirectClub, has insisted that a self-regulating state professional board is not itself the state, so a board’s actions might be subject to federal antitrust law. In the SmileDirectClub cases, however, state regulators have acted as required by state legislatures and as expressed in state dental practice acts. The boards’ activities here are therefore cloaked in the states’ immunity to antitrust litigation and should be treated deferentially by federal courts. Furthermore, judicial review of the substance of every regulation to which SmileDirectClub objects is inappropriate under principles of constitutional law. In the interest of public safety, courts should permit state dental regulators to fulfill their mandates and ensure that all dental providers comply with state health regulations.

The article addresses the role market definition can play for EU competition practice in the platform economy. The focus is on intermediaries that bring together groups of users whose decisions are interdependent, which therefore are commonly referred to as ‘two-sided platforms’. We address challenges to market definition that accompany these cross-group network effects, assess current practice in a number of competition cases, and provide guidance for adapting practice to properly account for the economic forces shaping markets with two-sided platforms. We ask whether and when a single market can be defined that encompasses both sides. We advocate a multi-markets approach that takes account of cross-market linkages, acknowledges the existence of zero-price markets, and properly accounts for the homing behaviour of market participants.

Distorted images of American regulatory ideas and practices frame foreign responses to these practices as well as foreign views of the economic policies of the United States. U.S. power both embeds and contributes to these distorted images. This article highlights the evolution of these distortions and the ways in which business history has intertwined with legal and political history throughout the evolution. It focuses on a specific area of regulation—antitrust or competition law—in order to ground the more general discussion. The article provides insights into the relationship between cognitive distance and power and into its pernicious effects on transnational discussions and decisions involving competition law.

Minorco, S.A., a Luxembourg mining company allegedly controlled by South African interests, commenced a tender offer for Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC (Gold Fields), a British mining company. Gold Fields, together with its partially owned American subsidiary, Newmont Mining Corp. (Newmont), filed suit in U.S. federal district court to enjoin the tender offer. The district court held that Newmont, the affected American subsidiary, had standing to raise an antitrust claim and issued a preliminary injunction restraining the tender offer. The district court dismissed a claim based on alleged violation of U.S. securities laws for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and held that Gold Fields, as the target company, did not itself have standing to raise an antitrust claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (per Newman, J.) reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that: (1) Newmont had standing under the U.S. antitrust laws to object to the tender offer; (2) Gold Fields also had antitrust standing (by 2-1); and (3) the U.S. courts did have subject matter jurisdiction over Gold Fields’s U.S. securities law claims. Accordingly, the court of appeals upheld the injunction and returned the case to the lower court for further proceedings. On remand, the district court found that inasmuch as Gold Fields had not demonstrated a likelihood that its U.S. securities law claims would be successful on the merits, those claims did not merit an injunction. The court also ruled that Minorco had failed to demonstrate that its plan to hold separate and sell the assets of Gold Fields posing the possible antitrust problem would provide adequate protection, and so kept the injunction against the tender offer in place. As a result, even though a majority of the Gold Fields shareholders had tendered their shares to Minorco and both British and European Communities regulatory authorities had approved the transaction, Minorco was forced to abandon its tender offer.