The Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), once regarded as the jewel in the crown of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has been facing a variety of serious criticisms for its inherent limitations and problems while its appellate review function has been paralyzed. Discussions on the reform of the WTO DSM have been under way for several years now. Many key items are on the reform agenda, one of which is to introduce Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) proceedings to the WTO DSM. Among several options of ADR, ‘mediation’ can offer an important set of tools for the WTO and its Members to resolve disputes in a more efficient and prompt manner. If properly structured, mediation can complement the existing binding proceedings of panels and the Appellate Body. At the same time, introduction of mediation to the WTO DSM may also cause additional legal and practical problems. It may cause further delays, confidentiality traps, due process myriads, and enforcement loopholes. It is vital to introduce mediation provisions to address those critical problems. Systematized and structuralized mediation in the WTO DSM will be able to offer a viable alternative path to resolve certain complex and sensitive disputes.

The Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has not heard an appeal since 2019. This article explores how adjudicators and member states have navigated WTO dispute settlement in this post-AB world. It begins by providing an overview of dispute settlement practice from 2020 to 2022, including by cataloguing appeals into the void, appeals to arbitration, and appeals forewent. It explains the incentives created by the lack of a functioning appeals mechanism and provides background on the alternative appeals procedure agreed to among a subset of WTO members: the Multi-Party Interim Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA). Moreover, it closely examines five WTO disputes: Colombia–Frozen Fries, Turkey–Pharmaceutical Products, EU–Steel Safeguards, Thailand–Cigarettes, and Costa Rica–Avocados. Through these five disputes, the article examines the circumstances in which members have agreed to binding appeals arbitration even absent formally committing to the MPIA, the circumstances in which members have appealed to arbitration or foregone such appeals, and whether facilitated negotiations present a workable alternative to an effective appeals mechanism. Finally, this article closely analyzes the reasoning of two appeals arbitration awards issued to date – Colombia–Frozen Fries and Turkey–Pharmaceutical Products – with a special focus on how those awards depart from AB precedent and what those departures can tell us about the current crisis.

This paper offers a comprehensive study of the jurisprudence on the ‘as a result of unforeseen developments’ test under the WTO's safeguards (SG) rules. It contributes to the existing scholarship by making three fresh arguments. First, the Appellate Body's decision to ‘revive’ this test as a prerequisite for the application of SG measures is not necessarily incompatible with the drafting record of the SG Agreement, even though this agreement does not make explicit reference to the test. Second, the test is not excessively difficult to satisfy under the standard of review established by case law, even though governments failed to pass it in almost all SG disputes to date. Third, in sharp contrast, the recent US–Safeguard Measure on PV Products decision took a strikingly more deferential approach which fell far short of the established standard of review, leading to the first and only decision in which the test was found to be satisfied. This decision has arguably created a new standard which could lead to abuse of SG measures and damage to the dispute settlement system and hence should be avoided in future disputes.

The dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) knew considerable success in its early years, being described as the WTO's crown jewel. In recent years, the jewel has become tarnished. Its principal actor – the Appellate Body – is no longer functioning, and the practice of the membership has been to appeal almost all new panel reports, thereby consigning them to a legal limbo from which they seem unlikely to ever emerge. This paper briefly reviews the record of the WTO dispute settlement system, considers the problems that led to its current state and evaluates various proposals that have been made to reinvigorate the system.

Unhappy with the rulings of the WTO dispute settlement system, which disproportionately targeted US use of trade remedies, the United States ended the entire system in 2019. There are multiple hurdles to agreeing to new terms of trade remedy use and thus potentially restoring some form of binding dispute settlement. First, a change would affect access to policy flexibility by the now large number of users of trade remedies. Second, although China's exports are the overwhelming target of trade remedies, exporters in other countries increasingly find themselves caught up in trade remedy actions linked to China. Third, critical differences posed by China's economic model may call for new rules for trade remedies, but no consensus on those rules has emerged. Even some of the most promising reforms have practical limitations, create additional challenges, or may be politically unviable.

Current political challenges facing the WTO Appellate Body raise fundamental questions about the relationship between rules and values in international adjudication. This article applies insights from legal philosophy to identify the role values should play in WTO adjudication. It argues that nothing about the specifics of WTO law would justify excluding values from adjudication; that the doctrinal, political and institutional context of WTO adjudication makes a positivist account of the role of values untenable; but an anti-positivist account requires complementing established economic accounts of WTO law's purpose with an account of fairness and justice in trade and trade regulation.

The Bananas decision demonstrated that WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body are capable of effectively and clearly analyzing whether extremely complex measures are consistent with WTO rules. The trade-liberalizing decision established the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as a meaningful constraint on discriminatory measures with an impact on both goods and services and clarified the nature of the GATS Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation. The decision also severely constrained the ability of the EU to justify non-tariff discriminatory measures such as the quota allocation system at issue in Bananas based on the Lomé waiver.