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2 results

  • 3 - Artificial Moral Agents

  • from Part I - Foundations of Responsible AI
  • Edited by Silja Voeneky, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Germany, Philipp Kellmeyer, Oliver Mueller, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Germany, Wolfram Burgard, Technische Universität Nürnberg
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Responsible Artificial Intelligence
    Published online:
    28 October 2022
    Print publication:
    17 November 2022, pp 31-49
    • Chapter
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  • Summary

    The chapter by the philosopher Catrin Misselhorn provides an overview of the most central debates in artificial morality and machine ethics. Artificial moral agents are AI systems which are able to recognise the morally relevant aspects of a situation and take them into account in their decisions and actions. Misselhorn shows that artificial morality is not just a matter of Science Fiction scenarios but rather an issue that has to be considered today. She lays the conceptual foundations of artificial morality and discusses the ethical issues that arise. She addresses questions like: which morality should be part of an AI system? Can AI systems be aligned with human morality, or do they need a machine-specific morality? Are there decisions, which should never be transferred to machines? Could artificial morality have impacts on human morality if it becomes more pervasive? These and other questions relating to AI are discussed and answered.

  • 12 - The ethics of IT-artefacts

  • Edited by Luciano Floridi, University of Hertfordshire
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    15 April 2010, pp 201-218

  • Summary

    This chapter provides an overview of the main approaches in the field of Science and technology studies (STS) with regard to technical artefacts. It describes various kinds of increasingly capable information technology (IT) artefacts as agents and discusses what kind of attributions (intentionality, selfrepresentation, attribution of intentionality to others by an artefact, etc.) might be meaningful. The chapter discusses the question of whether there is anything that sets IT-artefacts apart from technical artefacts. It argues that we might have to accept the idea that IT-artefacts possess some form of intentionality independent of humans in order to make sense of their behaviour and their moral status. The question of whether artefacts need mental states in order to count as moral agents focuses on what is required for moral agency and, in particular, on whether IT-artefacts need mental states in order to be able to act morally.