The question under which circumstances an undertaking is liable for its own competition law infringement – not to mention the liability for infringements committed by an affiliated undertaking – is of invaluable practical importance. From the early days of European competition law, there has been an interesting legal relationship between the single economic entity as the addressee of EU competition law and the respective entities under national corporate laws. Legend has it, businesses in some European jurisdictions can avoid fines by way of corporate restructuring, whilst in other jurisdictions this is not an option. The present contribution traces the developments in the EU and in Germany during recent years with special regard to the so-called German sausage gap – a once well-known and much-exploited lacuna that helped shelter companies from liability through specific corporate restructuring.

The imposition of effective cartel sanctions is shaped by the policy of and guidelines from enforcing authorities, such as the European Commission, as well as the Union Courts. The application of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines has been guided by the jurisprudence of the Union Courts. The Courts have in general upheld the fining methodology expressed in the guidelines and have clarified the way it should be applied in specific situations. The fact that the system of setting and reviewing EU competition fines was found lawful adds to the legitimacy of such fines and their enhanced deterrent effect. The aim of authorities and reviewing courts is to impose adequate and deterrent sanctions, while respecting the rights of defence of the undertakings.