It is fitting that the last example we introduced in the book was about the Internet Research Agency’s (IRA) use of social media, analytics, and recommendation systems to wage disinformation campaigns and sow anger and social discord on the ground. At first glance, it seems odd to think of that as primarily an issue of technology. Disinformation campaigns are ancient, after all; the IRA’s tactics are old wine in new boxes. That, however, is the point. What matters most is not particular features of technologies. Rather, it is how a range of technologies affect things of value in overlapping ways. The core thesis of our book is that understanding the moral salience of algorithmic decision systems requires understanding how such systems relate to an important value, viz., persons’ autonomy. Hence, the primary through line of the book is the value itself, and we have organized it to emphasize distinct facets of autonomy and used algorithmic systems as case studies.

This chapter concludes by responding to some of the controversies about artificial intelligence and possible criticisms of AI legal neutrality. It argues that AI legal neutrality is important regardless of whether AI broadly achieves superhuman performance, and that the law would not want to constrain AI development for protectionist reasons. It further argues that AI legal neutrality is a coherent principle for policymakers to apply, even though it allows the law to treat AI and people differently and will sometimes be at odds with other regulatory goals. Finally, it discusses some of the risks and dangers of AI and argues these are susceptible to management with appropriate legal frameworks.