This article examines the necessity for constitutional adjudication in a democracy. Democracy is not the government of the minority by the majority, but self-government of the people in a pluralist society. The article regards constitutional adjudication as a necessary component of a constitutional democracy to preserve self-government and individual rights as a pre-condition for the acceptance of majority decisions by the minority. Thus, constitutional adjudication is needed to uphold the possibility of democratic change and to protect individual rights also against the majority. Recent critique of individual decisions does not change this basic insight and practice of constitutional democracies.

The Sustainable Development Goals have attracted both defenders and critics. Composed of seventeen goals and 169 targets, the overly broad scope of the SDGs raises the question of whether there are priorities that need to be set within them. This essay considers the SDGs from the perspective of a “basic goods approach” to development policy, which takes a needs-based and basic-subsistence-rights view on policy priorities. It focuses on a subset of SDGs that directly address the provision of nutritious food, clean water, sanitation, health services, education services, and human security services. In doing so, it proposes a set of seven “basic development goals” and ten associated targets. It argues that this more focused approach can better protect basic rights, more effectively contribute to progress on human wellbeing, and make accountability more likely.

This article examines the changing status of constituent power in contemporary constitutionalism. It considers how, at face value, contemporary constitutional law reflects a post-constituent constitutional order, which is defined by a rupture with classical constitutional principles, such that the extra-legal source of constitutional order is diminished. However, it argues that the common perception of a decline in constituent power in constitutional norm construction is marked by an excessively literalistic understanding of the origins of constitutional norms and practices. As an alternative, drawing on systems-theoretical methodologies, the article proposes a functionalist, sociologically attuned reconstruction of the historical content of constitutional concepts, including the concept of constituent power. Through this perspective, it explains that constituent power, in conjunction with constitutional rights, always acted, not as an externally founding source of political agency, but as an inner projection of the political system, which served the internal organization of the political system as a distinct societal domain. The article concludes that the transnational constitutional models which are widespread in contemporary society, far from negating constituent power, re-articulate its primary functions, and they realize potentials for preserving the autonomy of the political system which constituent power always contained.