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This chapter explores whether neutrality, in a legal or moral sense, declined or transformed during the Great War. It focuses on neutrality as a guideline foreign policy, and explains why some countries could and did remain neutral, while others could or did not. The chapter also explains the reasons why neutrality as a foreign policy option failed some countries at one point or another during the war. Perhaps the fates of Belgium, Luxembourg and Albania helped to inspire Daniel Frey, a Swiss scholar, to posit a novel, three-level analysis of neutrality. The first level concerns the external conditions necessary for a successful neutrality policy. The second level concerns the external credibility of neutrality. The third level deals with the compatibility of neutrality with the other policies of a neutral state. Finally, the chapter shows that the way in which the modus vivendi was negotiated between neutrals and belligerents varied considerably.
Recognition of States — Effect of Non — Recognition — Belligerent Parties — Non — Recognition of Israel by Egypt.
Belligerent Parties — Effect of Non-Recognition of One Belligerent as a State — Non-Recognition of Israel by Egypt.
Existence of State of War — Municipal Ruling thereon — Whether Conclusively Binding on Prize Court — Non-Recognition of Opposing Belligerent as a State — Effect of Non-Recognition on Belligerency — Recognition by Other States — Non-Recognition of Israel by Egypt.
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