While Late Antique decretals were being transmitted to new generations, popes corresponded with kings and emperors, by the mid-to-late eighth century at times in surprisingly faulty Latin, and a new genre of papal document appeared alongside them, solemn privileges, written on papyrus, two or three meters long, mostly for monasteries. Not much thought was required to compose them, as beneficiaries brought drafts of the substantive part and a formulary supplied the top and the tail. What exactly these privileges granted is a matter of debate. They were written in a script descended from late Roman cursive and hard to read. This was probably an advantage. The archaic script concealed bad Latin. And the appearance would have inspired awe. In the eleventh century the late Roman script and the long papyrus format were abandoned, to be replaced by new devices to make the document impressive. What exactly they were granting to monasteries became clearer in the twelfth century.

This chapter examines sequences of offers by sellers in gourmet shops, video documented in a dozen cities across Europe, focusing on offers of a taste of cheese. Such offers to taste are shown to occur in two types of sequential contexts. They are made when a customer has expressed interest in a product but displays some hesitation in deciding whether to purchase it or not. Such offers to taste pursue sale of the cheese; they are not simple small gifts. Participants orient to this character of the offers by treating them as providing assistance in decision making. On the other hand, if the offer is made sequentially too late or too early, it is rejected, underlining the pursuit of sale at work in an offer of a taste. A contrasting environment of offers is also examined. In these cases, a plate of small pre-cut pieces of cheese are on the counter for anyone to try. The offers are typically accepted by the customer but without leading to buying. This enriches our understanding of the preference organization of offers and requests, and the relationships between benefactor/beneficiary, further supporting the relationship between the offer and the pursuit of the offerer’s interests.

Unexplained Wealth Orders (UWOs) are investigative tools brought in by the Criminal Finances Act 2017, which give new powers to the UK law enforcement authorities to fight money laundering. UWOs apply to individuals and other structures, e.g., trusts and companies, and require a respondent to explain the nature and extent of his interest in particular assets and how the assets were obtained. These orders further apply to assets located within and outside of the United Kingdom. This chapter examines the addition of UWOs to the arsenal of anti-money laundering measures in the United Kingdom. Compliance with a UWO will make further inroads on the privacy of trusts since information will have to be disclosed about the origin of the funds used to obtain specific trust assets. In addition, the Criminal Finances Act 2017 adopts a wide definition of persons taken to ‘hold’ trust property. This includes a ‘beneficiary, whether actual or potential’. Given the absence of any guidance provided by the 2017 Act, the chapter seeks to interrogate the meaning of ‘hold’ and determine when a discretionary beneficiary ought to be treated as ‘holding’ trust assets for the purposes of UWOs.

This chapter analyses emergency calls to see how the incident report of callers is ascribed either the action of making a request to the emergency call centre or the action of providing a service to the call centre. In accordance with Whalen & Zimmerman (1987) and Bergmann (1993), we see that when the caller thanks the call-taker in response to the dispatching of assistance, the caller’s incident report is treated as a request, while the call-taker by thanking the caller ascribes to the caller the action of having provided a service. Adding to their analyses, this chapter shows that action-ascription is subject to local interactional contingencies much more than to interaction-external identities such as the caller’s relation to the incident. We show examples where callers who are directly involved in the incident are treated as providing a service and we show examples of witness-callers who are treated as making a request. For action-ascription, this means that the turn to which an action is ascribed and the turn that ascribes the action need not be adjacent. Further, this chapter shows that in these not-adjacent contexts, the interaction in between may strongly impact upon the eventual action-ascription.

Courts, practitioners, and academics alike have long considered corporate officers and directors to be fiduciaries of the public corporation and its shareholders. As corporate law has evolved, however, with the business judgment rule strengthening, the duties of care and loyalty narrowing in scope, and executive compensation schemes further introducing self-interest into corporate decision making, the fiduciary paradigm is no longer an accurate description of the nature of the relationship between corporate managers and the corporation. Corporate officers and directors have significant latitude to make decisions that take into consideration their self-interest while still satisfying their duties to the corporation. Further, the “best interests” of the corporate entity and its multitude of stakeholders are highly variable and often ill-defined, such that it would be impractical to pursue those interests as a singular goal. This Article argues that corporate officers and directors are not governed by fiduciary duties in the truest sense of the term. This misconceptualization inhibits an accurate understanding of the dynamics underlying corporate decision

Some interpersonal interactions involve substantial trust, while others do not. The interaction between an infirm, elderly parent who needs personal care or management of assets and an adult child who undertakes to provide it is an example of a relationship that typically involves substantial trust. Some other interactions, however, even long-term interactions or those between repeat players, can require much less trust because the terms of the arrangement are specific and entail strong verification protocols. This chapter focuses on the trust, in the precise legal sense of that term, and the relationship between the trustee of the trust and the trust’s beneficiaries and settlor. To what extent does trusteeship in the legal sense require trust in the general sense? The chapter examines the features of the express trust under modern U.S. law and practice that would seem to require there to be a significant degree of trust in the trustee by the trust’s beneficiaries and/or settlor. The paper also examines the features of modern U.S. trust law and practice that attempt to protect the trust’s settlor and/or beneficiaries so that they need not place worryingly high levels of trust in the trustee.

Most legal and juridical proceedings depend upon fixed positions with regards to human rights claims, especially where violations of rights are concerned, those of victims, perpetrators, witnesses, and sometimes, although to a lesser extent, beneficiaries. However, the social and political realities in which rights are embedded usually prove much murkier. For example, those who carry out atrocities one minute, might find themselves the object of state violence the next; witnesses who receive reparations or are able to sell their stories might seem like less innocent beneficiaries of the events of which they’ve given accounts, and a much broader notion of culpability calls into question the function or efficaciousness of identifying individual perpetrators. This chapter argues that literature is especially well-suited for evincing and elaborating such ambiguities and contradictions that inhere in the history and politics of human rights.

Most legal and juridical proceedings depend upon fixed positions with regards to human rights claims, especially where violations of rights are concerned, those of victims, perpetrators, witnesses, and sometimes, although to a lesser extent, beneficiaries. However, the social and political realities in which rights are embedded usually prove much murkier. For example, those who carry out atrocities one minute, might find themselves the object of state violence the next; witnesses who receive reparations or are able to sell their stories might seem like less innocent beneficiaries of the events of which they’ve given accounts, and a much broader notion of culpability calls into question the function or efficaciousness of identifying individual perpetrators. This chapter argues that literature is especially well-suited for evincing and elaborating such ambiguities and contradictions that inhere in the history and politics of human rights.