Chapter 6 considers how insights from legal risk management, international humanitarian law, strategic intelligence analysis and forecasting might help manage uncertainty and extra-legal biases in the jus ad bellum. The chapter proposes a framework drawing on these fields, using legal and extra-legal expertise to describe the legal and factual context, competing legal theories justifying or prohibiting force, multiple possible interpretations of current facts and future consequences of using or not using force and potential risks that any legal theory is challenged or disproven, and recommending whether to accept these risks and use force, take steps to reduce risks, or not to use force where these risks are too severe. The chapter applies this framework to the Kosovo and Afghanistan interventions, showing that the framework as applied by this author recommends more cautious decisions than those actually taken. The chapter considers how such a framework might have affected UK legal advice on the 2003 Iraq intervention. The chapter concludes that the framework may help address uncertainty and extra-legal intuitions, but does not eliminate the need for judgement, and raises significant normative questions.

Chapter 7 considers how the framework proposed in Chapter 6 potentially contradicts international lawyers’ professional responsibilities. The chapter first considers different approaches to such questions in different countries and professional contexts. It then examines lawyers’ professional responsibilities when dealing with difficult jus ad bellum cases, reporting interviewees’ views of such responsibilities and of risk management techniques. By identifying and reducing risks of legal challenge to use of force, the framework potentially focuses lawyers only on their role as ‘counsellor’, helping governments do whatever they want, rather than their normative role of ‘conscience’, urging governments to change their behaviour to abide by law. Such a framework might even advise decision-makers to accept clearly unlawful force if there is little risk of an action facing legal challenge. The chapter nevertheless argues lawyers could use the framework developed in Chapter 6 while fulfilling their professional responsibilities, by seeking a form of Rawlsian ‘reflective equilibrium’ with their own personal professional judgement to address legal and factual uncertainty and extra-legal intuitions in hard cases engaging the jus ad bellum.