Working with the assumption that properties depend for their instantiation on substances, I argue against a unitary analysis of instantiation. On the standard view, a property is instantiated just in case there is a substance that serves as the bearer of the property. But this view cannot make sense of how properties that are mind-dependent depend for their instantiation on minds. I consider two classes of properties that philosophers often take to be mind-dependent: sensible qualities like color and bodily sensations like itches. Given that the mind is never itself literally red or itchy, we cannot explain the instantiation of these qualities as a matter of their having a mental bearer. Appealing to insights from Berkeley, I defend a view on which a property can be instantiated not in virtue of having a bearer—mental or material—but rather in virtue of being the object of a conscious act of perception. In the second half of the paper, I suggest that the best account of sensible qualities and bodily sensations ultimately makes use of both varieties of instantiation.

Background: Theories concerning the aetiology of functional neurological symptom disorder (FNSD; also known as conversion disorder) have historically inferred that psychological factors or dissociative states underlie patients’ symptoms. Current psychological models of functional neurological symptoms suggest that some type of ‘top-down’ representations/beliefs are activated automatically (without conscious awareness), leading to symptoms. It is assumed that these representations or beliefs are similar to the idea ‘I am neurologically damaged’, as in our clinical experience, almost all patients have some reason to doubt the integrity of their neurological system. Aims: It was hypothesized that FNSD arises from a belief of being neurologically damaged (via a mechanism akin to a nocebo response), and an interdisciplinary treatment protocol was developed consistent with this hypothesis, transparently sharing this theory with participants. Method: A retrospective consecutive case series design was utilized, measuring functional independence and symptom remission. Results: Of the 13 episodes of care, 12 resulted in complete or almost complete symptom remission. Length of stay in rehabilitation was also reduced compared with previous treatment attempts. Conclusions: It appears as if the treatment protocol may be very effective, and further controlled study appears warranted.

During the last decades, research on cognition has undergone a reformation, which is necessary to take into account when evaluating the cognitive and behavioural aspects of therapy. This reformation is due to the research programme called Embodied Cognition (EC). Although EC may have become the theoretical authority in current cognitive science, there are only sporadic examples of EC-based therapy, and no established framework. We aim to build such a framework on the aims, methods and techniques of the current third-wave of CBT. There appears to be a possibility for cross-fertilization between EC and CBT that could contribute to the development of theory and practice for both of them. We present a case-study of an EC-based model of intervention for working with self-control in cerebral palsy. We centre the results of the study and its discussion on how we should understand and work with self-control in a more general sense from both an EC and a CBT perspective. We end by elaborating the five learning objectives and present suggestions for follow-up reading.

Body-focused repetitive behaviours (BFRBs) including trichotillomania, skin picking, and nail biting, are non-functional self-destructive habits, which have a severe negative impact on everyday functioning. Although BFRBs cause distress, they are maintained by both negative (relief) and positive (stimulation) reinforcement. The emotional regulation (ER) model proposes that people with BFRBs have a general deficit in ER and, as a consequence, engage in BFRBs to alleviate affect and reinforce the behaviour. The current study was designed to explore differences in ER between people with BFRBs and controls to identify specific emotions triggering BFRBs. Forty-eight participants (24 BFRB, 24 controls) completed questionnaires measuring Difficulties in Emotional Regulation (DERS), a Triggers Scale and an Affective Regulation Scale (ARS). Significant differences in people with BFRBs and controls were reported principally on the DERS subscales of lack of emotional clarity, difficulties in impulse control, and access to ER strategies. On the ARS, the BFRB group reported overall difficulty ‘snapping out’ of emotions. The majority of BFRBs were reported to be triggered by anxiety (78%), tension (70%), or boredom (52%). The clinical implication is that ER could be beneficially targeted in therapy for BFRBs.

Background: Perseveration reflects the tendency to engage in a behavior even when it is no longer rewarding nor produces the expected consequences. Method: The current study explored whether (1) individuals endorsing a recent (past 2 years) history of nonclinical panic attacks would report greater levels of perseveration compared to individuals without such a history; (2) whether individuals endorsing higher levels of perseveration would evidence greater panic-relevant responding to a 4-minute 10% carbon dioxide-enriched air challenge. Results: Results indicated that individuals with, compared to without, a positive panic attack history endorsed significantly greater levels of perseveration. Additionally, greater pre-challenge levels of perseveration significantly predicted greater panic attack symptom severity as well as self-reported anxiety; these significant effects were evident above and beyond the variance accounted for by sex, trait-level negative affectivity, panic attack status, and distress tolerance as well as shared variance with the related constructs of persistence and perfectionism. Discussion: Together, the current findings provide initial, albeit preliminary, support for the utlity of investigating perseveration in relation to models of panic psychopathology specifically, and offer a further empirical context for perseveration-psychopathology relations in general.

This study investigated whether anxiety in patients who have had a myocardial infarction is maintained through similar processes to those proposed in the cognitive models of panic disorder (Clark, 1986) and health anxiety (Warwick and Salkovskis, 1990). Anxious (n = 22) and non-anxious (n = 29) patients, who all had an MI 3–12 months before testing, participated. The groups were compared on self-report measures of risk perception, bodily vigilance, illness perceptions the type of causal attributions (somatic, normalizing and psychological) generated for congruent and incongruent types of anxiety-related bodily sensations (cardiac, respiratory, gastro-intestinal and cognitive dyscontrol). Anxious, compared to non-anxious, MI participants perceived themselves to be at higher risk of a further MI, had higher levels of bodily vigilance and more negative emotional and cognitive representations of their MI. Anxious participants generated significantly more somatic attributions and fewer normalizing attributions, than non-anxious participants for cardiac sensations. There was also a trend for anxious participants to generate this pattern of attributions for respiratory items. The study provides evidence that the models of health anxiety (Warwick and Salkovskis, 1990) and panic disorder (Clark, 1986) are useful in understanding persistent anxiety following an MI.