We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter argues that the role of the judge in the collaborative scheme is not to be the faithful agent to the legislature, but rather that the courts should be constructive partners to the legislature in the constitutional scheme, where they are both oriented towards the common goal of achieving good government under the constitution, albeit in their own role-specific ways. In charting the active and creative role of the courts in the constitutional scheme, the chapter emphasises the epistemic and institutional constraints under which courts labour. It also highlights the active and valuable contribution they make to the constitutional system as a whole. The final section of the chapter examines ’the principle of legality’, namely, the presumption of statutory interpretation employed by Anglo-Commonwealth courts that they will read statutory provisions as compliant with rights, unless the contrary is made crystal clear in the statutory language. It is argued that, though ’the principle of legality’ is a powerful judicial tool which judges can use to ensure that rights are protected, it can operate in ’representation-reinforcing’ and even ’democracy-enhancing’ ways.
Beyond Indian Law: documents the Rehnquist Court’s shift away from jurisprudence that permitted a sovereign people to control their own territory, and the people within it, and toward a ‘subjectivist approach’ that allows the Supreme Court to determine what Indian law ought to be. It places this shift within a broader narrative of the Court deviating from well-established interpretive principles. Getches ultimately critiques the signals the Rehnquist Court has sent in its existing jurisprudence and warns that future cases will see state interests prevail in their control of the reservation, attempts to protect Indians as sovereigns will fail, and that mainstream values will be protected.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.