The past two decades have witnessed Macao’s development into the casino capital of the world. Casinos have significantly transformed all respects of Macao society—a phenomenon termed as the casinoization of Macao. While much research has explored how casinoization has affected Macao’s socioeconomic developments, empirical research on the relationship between casinoization and law enforcement agencies is extremely limited. Using official statistics and interviews with serving and retired police officers as well as police applicants in Macao, this article examines the quick-money mentality, laissez-faire regulation, and the paradox of plenty, three features of casinoization, and their profound impact on the Macao police. First, the early phase of casino liberalization created a draining effect on human capital from the police force. Second, the lucrative casino tax revenues empowered the government to resolve the labour shortage issue and significantly improve the police image. Third, casinoization inadvertently reinforced the colonial legacy of laissez-faire regulation, hampering the progress of institutional reforms. Fourth, the decline of casino has contributed to the unprecedented “police fever” among the youth in Macao.

This article provides an account of the development of the casino industry in Chile. For most of the 1930s up to the 1980s the industry remained stagnant and restricted to a few locations. From 1990 the industry grew, but in particular after 2005 following a new law that permitted the creation of new casinos in all regions, with the main aim of promoting tourism. The new casinos had to operate as part of an “integral project,” which included sizable investments in the tourism sector. This was a novel business development strategy. The new industry attracted old and new investors, including foreign operators, who often associated with Chilean business groups, providing the resources needed to finance these developments and enjoying healthy profits for most of the period.

With ongoing consequences for American Indians, the New World Indian has been a pervasive figure of constitutive exclusion in modern theories of money, property, and government. This paradoxical exclusion of indigenous peoples from the money/property/government complex is intrinsic to, and constitutive of, modern theories of money. What is more, it haunts the cultural politics of indigenous peoples’ economic actions. In Part I, I establish that, and how, indigeneity has been constitutively present at the foundation of modern theories of money, as Europeans and settlers defined indigenous peoples in part by the absence of money and property (of which money is a special form). In turn, and more to the point here, they defined money and property in part as that which modern non-indigenous people have and use. These are not solely economic matters: the conceptual exclusions from money/property were coproduced with juridical ones insofar as liberal political theory grounded the authority of modern government in private property (and, in turn, in money). To show how this formation of money and indigeneity has mattered both for disciplinary anthropology and for American public culture at several historical moments, Part II traces how the dilemmas expressed by these texts haunt subsequent debates about the function of wampum, the logic of potlatch, and the impact of tribal gaming. Such debates inform scholarship beyond the boundaries of anthropology and, as each case shows in brief, they create harms and benefits for peoples in ways that perpetuate the (il)logics and everyday practices of settler colonialism.