From this point on, main issues in system theory are tackled. The very first, considered in this chapter, is the all-important question of system identification. This is perhaps the most basic question in system theory and related linear algebra, with a large pedigree starting from Kronecker's characterization of rational functions to its elegant solution for time-variant systems presented here. Identification, often also called realization, is the problem of deriving the internal system’s equations (called state-space equations) from input–output data. In this chapter, we only consider the causal, or block-lower triangular case, although the theory applies just as well to an anti-causal system, for which one lets the time run backward, applying the same theory in a dual form.

Several kinds of relations between events often have distinct complex sentence constructions, in particular those involving degree, causation, factivity (epistemic stance), or a combination of these. Comparative and equative constructions compare degrees of a property predicated of two different referents. The strategy chosen depends on the strategy used for temporal complex sentences, at least for comparative constructions. Conditional constructions express a causal relation (content, epistemic, or speech act), but, unlike causal relations, also express a nonfactive (neutral or negative) epistemic stance toward the events. Past tense constructions are often recruited to express nonfactivity. Concessive constructions presuppose a causal relation that is unexpectedly violated; concessive conditional constructions are the nonfactive counterparts. Strategies use conjunctions recruited from conditionals or expressions of obstinacy, focus marking, and remarkable co-occurrence. Concessive conditionals use a scalar, alternative, or universal strategy to conceptualize the concessive conditional relation. Other relations, such as the comparative conditional, may also be conventionalized.

Authoritarian regimes vary with respect to regime–opposition relations, along a continuum of more open to more closed, focusing on the degree of competition the regime permits during elections. The particular political opportunity structure facing any individual opposition group varies according to the strategies that the regime uses in dealing with that particular group: inclusion, co-optation, or exclusion. The microfoundations of both party formation and political mobilization do not operate in isolation or in the same way as they do in established democracies, but in fact interact with the effects of the political opportunity structure that existed during the prior authoritarian era. An examination of the common competing explanations for party formation and political mobilization show that, while each explanation arguably does play a role in shaping these outcomes, they are limited in their comparative utility and frequently fail to explain the actual variation observed in these cases. Instead, mechanisms link the structure of state–opposition relations and the political opportunity structure facing different groups to their relative decisions around party formation as well as to the tactics and effectiveness of political mobilization in founding elections. Finally, the common causes of opposition group dissolution interact with the opportunity structure of the authoritarian era.

Chapter 2 starts by analysing free and forced oscillations in a simple mechanical system, and the method of complex representation of sinusoidal oscillation is introduced, including phasor diagram in the complex plane. Moreover, the concepts of active and reactive power for such a system are introduced. Then the method of state-space analysis is introduced and applied to a linear system. Further, the delta 'function' and other related distributions, as well as Fourier analysis, are introduced and applied to linear systems. Moreover, causal and noncausal systems are considered, as well as Kramers–Kronig relations and the Hilbert transform.

In the concluding chapter I review the arguments presented in the book, such as that attention is evidence for a self with its own causal power, that attention is necessary for conscious perception, that consciousness can occur without the benefit of attention, and that action and responsibility do not require attention. I briefly discuss some possible extensions of the work and suggest how one might see this perspective of the mind to fit in with other contemporary accounts.