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Summary

Chpater 4 argues that an account of causation in terms of quasi-inertial processes and interferences handles problematic cases of pre-emption and overdetermination better than rival accounts. It also explains why and how the causal relations fail to be transitive.

Summary

I argue that our ordinary concept of causation (‘disruptive causation’) can be spelled out in terms of quasi-inertial processes and interferences. These processes and factors, in turn, can be fully explicated in terms of the generalisations provided by physics, biology or other sciences. The quasi-inertial processes in particular can be characterised in terms of the behaviour systems are disposed to in the absence of interfering factors and thus in terms of ceteris paribus generalisations and their underlying dispositions.

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Chapter 4 - Causation – Application and Augmentation

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Chapter 3 - Causation – Conceptual Groundwork

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Chapter 4 - Causation – Application and Augmentation

Summary

Chapter 3 - Causation – Conceptual Groundwork

Summary