In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation.

This paper considers actuarial science within the context of the framework provided by the formal study of scientific method. A review of key points of recent developments within the methodology (study of method) of science and the methodology of economics is presented. A characterisation of actuarial science and its methods is then developed using as inputs the United Kingdom actuarial education syllabus and recent work of the profession, most notably Bell et al., (1998). The methods of actuarial science are then considered within the framework provided by formal methodology to propose an articulation of the methodology of actuarial science. This methodology is explored in relation to that of other sciences, and some of the implications and opportunities for actuarial science which arise from this investigation are identified. The paper concludes that actuarial science has a distinctive and potentially powerful empirical method of applied approximation. This methodological analysis is intended, in part, to add to the momentum of the programme concerned with furthering the use of actuarial methods within broader spheres (eg Nowell et al., 1996).