We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter presents an analysis on Kofi Annan’s mediation efforts in Syria and focuses on his agency when overseeing the UN’s entry into the Syrian conflict. The chapter is divided in three main sections. The first offers a concise background of the main mediation initiatives pursued during Annan’s time as mediator. Of which there were five main mediation policies and responses – the mediator’s entry into the conflict, the Six-Point Plan, the nationwide ceasefire and deployment of UNSMIS, the Geneva I process, and the mediator’s resignation. Using a first-level analysis, the second section continues to elucidate the agency of the mediator in shaping each of these mediation outcomes. Finally, the third section explores the dynamics behind the mediator’s decision-making. Specifically, it examines how the mediator’s key strategic perceptions influenced his decision-making. Drawing on the contingency model, four categories of perceptions are studied – the identity of the mediator, the context of mediation, the parties, and the process of mediation. Building off this analysis, the chapter proposes general links between each category of perceptions and specific mediation behaviors.
The dispute between India and Pakistan over the State of Jammu and Kashmir is the United Nations’ longest running and among its most intractable problems, beginning in 1947 and still continuing more than 70 years later. Australia was involved in trying to resolve this dispute for almost half this time. As a fellow member of the Commonwealth, Australia had an early interest in contributing to diplomatic negotiations, and an Australian, Owen Dixon, was the first UN mediator. Another Australian, Major General Robert Nimmo, was appointed Chief Military Observer in 1950 and remained in the job for a further 15 years. Meanwhile, Australian military observers served in Kashmir (as Jammu and Kashmir were often described) for some 35 years until the Australian Government withdrew them in 1985. Also, between 1975 and 1979, Australia provided an aircraft with crew to support the UN observer mission. This chapter describes the early diplomatic efforts; later chapters are devoted to the observer mission and the Air Force contribution.