This study examines how beliefs interact with heterogeneous donation preferences in determining people's donation decisions and choices of revision and observability. We conducted an online experiment eliciting participants’ first-order beliefs, that is, beliefs about an average donor's contribution, with the opportunity of being recognized. We also provided the opportunity for donation revision to a group of randomly selected participants. Our study results show that people's first-order beliefs are positively correlated with their willingness to donate and their actual donations. Moreover, first-order beliefs also interact with people's heterogeneous donation preferences in jointly determining their decisions of donation revision and observability – their tendency to opt in for public recognition. Donors with low first-order beliefs and high donation preferences are most likely to opt in for recognition, but they are unlikely to revise their donations. Donors with high first-order beliefs and low donation preferences are most likely to revise their donations, but they are less likely to choose to be recognized. Donors with low first-order beliefs and low donation preferences display the lowest tendency toward revision and observability.

There is growing concern about the extent to which economic games played in the laboratory generalize to social behaviors outside the lab. Here, we show that it is possible to make a game much more predictive of field behavior by bringing contextual elements from the field to the lab. We report three experiments where we present the same participants with different versions of the dictator game and with two different field situations. The games are designed to include elements that make them progressively more similar to the field. We find a dramatic increase in lab–field correlations as contextual elements are incorporated, which has wide-ranging implications for experiments on economic decision making.

Subjects donate individually (control group) or in pairs (treatment group). Thosein pairs reveal their donation decision to each other. Average donations in thetreatment group are significantly higher than in the control group. Pairedsubjects have the opportunity to revise their donation decision afterdiscussion. Pair members shift toward each others’ initial decisions.Subjects are happier with their decision when their donations are larger, butthose in pairs are less happy, controlling for amount donated. These findingssuggest reluctant altruism due to peer pressure in charitable giving.

Some charities are much more cost-effective than other charities, which means that they can save many more lives with the same amount of money. Yet most donations do not go to the most effective charities. Why is that? We hypothesized that part of the reason is that people underestimate how much more effective the most effective charities are compared with the average charity. Thus, they do not know how much more good they could do if they donated to the most effective charities. We studied this hypothesis using samples of the general population, students, experts, and effective altruists in five studies. We found that lay people estimated that among charities helping the global poor, the most effective charities are 1.5 times more effective than the average charity (Studies 1 and 2). Effective altruists, in contrast, estimated the difference to be factor 50 (Study 3) and experts estimated the factor to be 100 (Study 4). We found that participants donated more to the most effective charity, and less to an average charity, when informed about the large difference in cost-effectiveness (Study 5). In conclusion, misconceptions about the difference in effectiveness between charities is thus likely one reason, among many, why people donate ineffectively.

There is an increased willingness to help identified individuals rather than non-identified, and the effect of identifiability is mainly present when a single individual rather than a group is presented. However, identifiability and singularity effects have thus far not been manipulated orthogonally. The present research uses a joint evaluation approach to examine the relative contribution of identifiability and singularity in moral decision-making reflecting conflicting values between deontology and consequentialism. As in trolley dilemmas subjects could either choose to stay with the default option, i.e., giving a potentially life-saving vaccine to a single child, or to actively choose to deny the single child the vaccine in favor of five other children. Identifiability of the single child and the group of children was varied between-subjects in a 2x2 factorial design. In total 1,232 subjects from Sweden and the United States participated in three separate experiments. Across all treatments, in all three experiments, 32.6% of the subjects chose to stay with the deontological default option instead of actively choosing to maximize benefits. Results show that identifiability does not always have a positive effect on decisions in allocation dilemmas. For single targets, identifiability had a negative or no effect in two out of three experiments, while for the group of targets identifiability had a more stable positive effect on subjects’ willingness to allocate vaccines. When the effect of identifiability was negative, process data showed that this effect was mediated by emotional reactance. Hence, the results show that the influence of identifiability is more complex than it has been previously portrayed in the literature on charitable giving.

We describe the “evaluability bias”: the tendency to weight the importance of an attribute in proportion to its ease of evaluation. We propose that the evaluability bias influences decision making in the context of charitable giving: people tend to have a strong preference for charities with low overhead ratios (lower administrative expenses) but not for charities with high cost-effectiveness (greater number of saved lives per dollar), because the former attribute is easier to evaluate than the latter. In line with this hypothesis, we report the results of four studies showing that, when presented with a single charity, people are willing to donate more to a charity with low overhead ratio, regardless of cost-effectiveness. However, when people are presented with two charities simultaneously—thereby enabling comparative evaluation—they base their donation behavior on cost-effectiveness (Study 1). This suggests that people primarily value cost-effectiveness but manifest the evaluability bias in cases where they find it difficult to evaluate. However, people seem also to value a low overhead ratio for its own sake (Study 2). The evaluability bias effect applies to charities of different domains (Study 3). We also show that overhead ratio is easier to evaluate when its presentation format is a ratio, suggesting an inherent reference point that allows meaningful interpretation (Study 4).

Existing evidence from laboratory experiments finds that a match is likely to increase charitable donations by more than a theoretically equivalent rebate. A number of explanations have been proposed for this in the literature. One idea, which has never been tested, is that people consider a match to be more generous, because unlike the rebate, there is no reward for making a donation in the match setting. We design a survey to determine whether people do consider matches more generous than rebates, and probe the reasons subjects give for their answers. We find that a significant number of people do consider rebates less generous because of the reward associated with donations in such a setting.

How do donors reason and justify their choices when faced with dilemmas in a charitable context? In two studies, Swedish students were confronted with helping dilemmas based on the identifiable victim effect, the proportion dominance effect and the ingroup effect. Each dilemma consisted of two comparable charity projects and participants were asked to choose one project over the other. They were then asked to provide justifications of their choice by stating the relative importance of different types of reasons. When faced with an identified victim dilemma, participants did not choose the project including an identified victim more often than the project framed statistically, but those who did emphasized emotional reasons (e.g., “Because I had more empathic feelings”), but not any other reasons, more than those choosing the statistical project. When faced with a Proportion dominance dilemma, participants more often chose the project with a high rescue proportion (e.g., you can save 100% out of 30) than the project with a low rescue proportion (e.g., you can save 4% out of 800), and those who did emphasized efficacy reasons (e.g., “Because my money can make a greater difference there”), but no other reasons, more than those favoring the low recue proportion project. Finally, when faced with an Ingroup dilemma, participants more often chose the project that could help ingroup-victims over the project that could help outgroup victims, and those who did emphasized responsibility reasons (e.g., “Because I have a greater obligation”), but no other reasons, more than those favoring outgroup projects. These results are consistent with and extend previous findings about how different helping effects are related to different psychological processes.

When people donate, they rarely give to the charities that do the most good perdollar. Why is this? One possibility is that they do not know how to giveeffectively. Another possibility is that they are not motivated to do so. Acrosssix tasks (Studies 1a, 1b), we found support for both explanations. Among laydonors, we observed multiple misconceptions—regarding disaster relief,overhead costs, donation splitting, and the relative effectiveness of local andforeign charities—that reduced the effectiveness of their giving.Similarly, we found that they were unfamiliar with the most effective charities(Studies 2a, 2b). Debunking these misconceptions and informing people abouteffectiveness boosted effective donations; however, a portion of lay donorscontinued to give ineffectively to satisfy their personal preferences. Bycontrast, a sample of self-identified effective altruists gave effectivelyacross all tasks. They exhibited none of the misconceptions that we observedamong lay donors and overwhelmingly favored the most effective option in theirchoice set (Study 3). Taken together, our studies imply that donors need to beboth informed and motivated to give effectively on a consistent basis.

We define philanthropy as voluntary giving by households or corporate bodies to promote charitable causes, projects, and organizations or, alternatively, as “voluntary action for the public good.” Entrepreneurial philanthropy refers specifically to “the pursuit by entrepreneurs on a not-for-profit basis of big social objectives through active investment of their economic, cultural, social and symbolic resources.” Government projects financed by taxation and interfamily resource transfers are never philanthropic. Gifts only qualify as philanthropic when the donor is under no compulsion to give, when the gift benefits people with whom the donor is not directly connected, when the gift is made from the donor's own resources, and when the donor receives no direct economic benefit as a consequence of making the gift. In other words, philanthropists invest their own resources in causes they believe will benefit others and that yield no direct benefit to themselves or their families.

Whilst philanthropy has long helped fund private initiatives for public good, governments are becoming more interested in expanding this income source as pressures on public spending increase. One outcome of multiple efforts to enhance philanthropy is the growth of giving circles, which involve individual donors collaborating to support causes of mutual interest. This research examines the degree to which giving circles are a good mechanism for enhancing philanthropy. Our overarching interest is to understand if giving circles in the UK and Ireland might serve to grow philanthropy as well as shift the logic of charity to meet the expectations of policy-makers.

Matching grants are a prevalent mechanism for funding environmental, conservation, and natural resource projects. However, economists have largely been silent regarding the potential benefits of these mechanisms at increasing voluntary contributions. To examine the behavioral responses to different match levels, this research uses controlled laboratory experiments with generically framed instructions and introduces a general-form matching-grant mechanism, referred to as the proportional contribution mechanism (PCM). Results show that contributions are positively correlated with both the match and the induced value of the public good even when a dominant strategy is free-riding. An implication of this partial demand revelation result is that manifestations of this type of “helping hand” social preference should be counted in benefit-cost analysis.

This study uses a field experiment involving 251 adult participants to determine which messages related to climate change, extreme weather events, and decaying infrastructure are most effective in encouraging people to pay more for investments that could alleviate future water-quality risks. The experiment also assesses whether people prefer the investments to be directed toward gray or green infrastructure projects. Messages about global warming induced climate change and decaying infrastructure lead to larger contributions than messages about extreme weather events. The results suggest that people are likely to pay more for green infrastructure projects than for gray infrastructure projects.

Previous research has demonstrated that the generally positive relationship between age and the presence of charitable giving becomes negative at the oldest ages. We investigate potential causes of this drop in charitable giving among the oldest old including changes in health, cognition, egocentric networks, religious attendance, and substitution of charitable bequest planning. A longitudinal analysis of data from the United States Health and Retirement Survey indicates that the drop in charitable giving is mediated largely by changes in the frequency of church attendance, with only modest influences from changes in health and cognition.

With the increase of childlessness in European societies, its consequences have become a matter of concern. Studies in this field, however, have concentrated on what childless people lack and need in terms of social, financial and moral support. In contrast, this article focuses on what childless people give to their families, friends, unrelated others and to society at large. Using 2004 data on social support and financial transfers given and received by people aged 50 or more years in ten European countries from the Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), the analyses show that the support networks of childless older people tend to be somewhat weaker than those of parents and that links with members of the younger generations in the family are stronger for parents than for those without children. The results also indicate, however, that the differences in transfer behaviour between parents and childless adults are small, and that the support networks of the childless are more diverse than those of parents, and characterised by stronger links with ascendants and lateral relatives and with non-relatives. Moreover, people without children tend to be more intensely involved in charities and comparable organisations.

In recent years, increasing public attention has been paid to voluntary action, civic engagement and philanthropy. It is in this framework that the growing numbers of childless older people are regarded as a valuable source of charitable giving. In fact, by giving to philanthropic foundations – instead of consuming their wealth or leaving inheritances – childless donors may develop into pioneers in the field of post-familial civic engagement. The article explores the circumstances under which childless older people adopt this behaviour in both Germany and the United States of America. It is found that making large donations or setting up philanthropic foundations is still an elite phenomenon, but on the other hand that establishing a foundation is attractive for childless people, both as a means of ensuring that one's name lives on, and as a way of organising bequests. Educational level, ill-health, social capital and religiosity all positively reinforce the inclination of childless people to transfer resources to charities. It is also shown that the institutional framework or organised fundraising has a large role in fostering charitable giving among the childless. The framework of charity organisations and fund raising in the country of residence plays an important role in determining the expansion and democratisation of charitable giving.