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In this book, it is argued that legal time is a Janus-faced phenomenon because it is based on two complement and contradictory forms of time: human and clock time. Clock time is the standardized conception of time; its uniform, precise, and predictable character makes it particularly apt for control and regulation in law. Human time, however, is always the time of someone, it is characterized by temporality (past, present, future), it is finite, irreversible, and cannot be stopped. One of the aims of this book is to show how an indeterminacy in legal time is at work; stemming from the intricate relationship between clock time and human time. The strain that I describe in legal time follows from the fact that human time is structurally different from legal time, a problem that cannot be solved in legal time. Yet, it can be acknowledged, and taking into account the peculiar character of human time in itself has normative value.
Time is one of the most important means for the exercise of power. In Migration Law, it is used for disciplining and controlling the presence of migrants within a certain territory through the intricate interplay of two overlapping but contradicting understandings of time – human and clock time. This book explores both the success and limitations of the usage of time for the governance of migration. The virtues of legal time can be seen at work in several temporal differentiations in migration law: differentiation based on temporality, deadlines, qualification of time and procedural differentiation. Martijn Stronks contests that, hidden in the usage of legal time in Migration Law, there is an argument for the inclusion of migrants on the basis of their right to human time. This assertion is based in the finite, irreversible and unstoppable character of human time.
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