Literature highlights the distinction between intuitive and analytic thinking as a prominent cognitive style distinction, leading to the proposal of various theories within the framework of the dual process model. However, it remains unclear whether individuals differ in their thinking styles along a single dimension, from intuitive to analytic, or if other dimensions are at play. Moreover, the presence of numerous thinking style measures, employing different terminology but conceptually overlapping, leads to confusion. To address these complexities, Newton et al. suggested the idea that individuals vary across multiple dimensions of intuitive–analytic thinking styles and distinguished thinking styles between 4 distinct types: Actively open-minded thinking, close-minded thinking, preference for effortful thinking, and preference for intuitive thinking. They proposed a new measure for this 4-factor disposition, The 4-Component Thinking Styles Questionnaire (4-CTSQ), to comprehensively capture the psychological outcomes related to thinking styles; however, no independent test exists. In the current pre-registered studies, we test the validity of 4-CTSQ for the first time beyond the original study and examine the association of the proposed measure with various factors, including morality, conspiracy beliefs, paranormal and religious beliefs, vaccine hesitancy, and ideology in an underrepresented culture, Türkiye. We found that the correlated 4-factor model of 4-CTSQ is an appropriate measure to capture individual differences based on cognitive style. The results endorse the notion that cognitive style differences are characterized by distinct structures rather than being confined to two ends of a single continuum.

When people are confronted with multiple tasks, how do they decide which task to do first? Normatively, priority should be given to the most efficient task (i.e., the task with the best cost/benefit ratio). However, we hypothesize that people consistently choose to address smaller (involving less work) tasks first, and continue to focus on smaller tasks, even when this strategy emerges as less efficient, a phenomenon we term the “smaller tasks trap”. We also hypothesize that the preference for the smaller tasks is negatively related to individual differences in the tendency for rational thinking. To test these hypotheses, we developed a novel paradigm consisting of an incentive-compatible task management game, in which participants are saddled with multiple tasks and have to decide how to handle them. The results lend weight to the smaller tasks trap and indicate that individual differences in rational thinking predict susceptibility to this trap. That is, participants low in rational thinking preferred to start with a smaller (vs. larger) task and focused more on the smaller tasks regardless of their efficiency. Consequently, their overall performance in the task management game was significantly lower. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings and suggest possible interventions that may help people improve their task management.

A substantial body of evidence suggests that favoring reason over intuition (employing an analytic cognitive style) is associated with reduced belief in God. In the current work, we address outstanding issues in this literature with two studies examining the relationship between analytic cognitive style (as measured by performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test) and belief in God. First, prior research focused on Judeo-Christian cultures, and it is uncertain whether the results generalize to other religious systems or beliefs. Study 1 helps to address this question by documenting a negative correlation between CRT performance and belief in God, r = −.18, in a sample of 513 participants from India, a majority Hindu country. Second, among 150 participants from the United Kingdom, Gervais et al. (2018) reported the first and (to date) only evidence for a positive relationship between CRT and belief in God. In Study 2, we assess the robustness of this result by recruiting 547 participants from the United Kingdom. Unlike Gervais et al., using the same items, we find a negative correlation between CRT and belief in God (r = −.19). Our results add further support to the argument that analytic thinking undermines belief in God.

We conducted additional analyses of Pennycook et al.’s (2015, Study 2) data to investigate the possibility that there would be ideological differences in “bullshit receptivity” that would be explained by individual differences in cognitive style and ability. As hypothesized, we observed that endorsement of neoliberal, free market ideology was significantly but modestly associated with bullshit receptivity. In addition, we observed a quadratic association, which indicated that ideological moderates were more susceptible to bullshit than ideological extremists. These relationships were explained, in part, by heuristic processing tendencies, faith in intuition, and lower verbal ability. Results are inconsistent with approaches suggesting that (a) there are no meaningful ideological differences in cognitive style or reasoning ability, (b) simplistic, certainty-oriented cognitive styles are generally associated with leftist (vs. rightist) economic preferences, or (c) simplistic, certainty-oriented cognitive styles are generally associated with extremist (vs. moderate) preferences. Theoretical and practical implications are briefly addressed.

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, French public opinion has been divided about Pr. Didier Raoult and his hydroxychloroquine-based treatment against COVID-19. In this paper, our aim is to contribute to the understanding of this polarization of public opinion by investigating the relationship between (analytic vs. intuitive) cognitive style and trust in Didier Raoult and his treatment. Through three studies (total N after exclusion = 950), we found that a more intuitive cognitive style predicted higher trust in Didier Raoult and his treatment. Moreover, we found that Trust in Raoult was positively associated with belief that truth is political, belief in conspiracy theories, belief in pseudo-medicines and pseudo-medical and conspiratorial beliefs regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. We also found a negative association with knowledge of scientific methods and regard for scientific method over personal experience. However, higher trust in Didier Raoult was not associated with self-reported compliance with official regulations concerning the COVID-19 pandemic.

The performance of a design team is influenced by each team member’s unique cognitive style – i.e., their preferred manner of managing structure as they solve problems, make decisions, and seek to bring about change. Cognitive style plays an important role in how teams of engineers design and collaborate, but the interactions of cognitive style with team organization and processes have not been well studied. The limitations of small-scale behavioral experiments have led researchers to develop computational models for simulating teamwork; however, none have modeled the effects of individuals’ cognitive styles. This paper presents the Kirton Adaption–Innovation Inventory agent-based organizational optimization model (KABOOM), the first agent-based model of teamwork to incorporate cognitive style. In KABOOM, heterogeneous agents imitate the diverse problem-solving styles described by the Kirton Adaption-Innovation construct, which places each individual somewhere along the spectrum of cognitive style preference. Using the model, we investigate the interacting effects of a team’s communication patterns, specialization, and cognitive style composition on design performance. By simulating cognitive style in the context of team problem solving, KABOOM lays the groundwork for the development of team simulations that reflect humans’ diverse problem-solving styles.

This study examined the role of sex and intelligence in the relationship between field dependence-independence and second language acquisition for a sample of 383 students (187 girls and 196 boys) aged between 13 and 16. The Portable Rod and Frame Test (PRFT) and the Embedded Figures Test (EFT) were used to evaluate cognitive style. A two-way covariance analysis, with intelligence as the covariate, was employed to investigate differences in second language achievement between students classified as either field-dependent or field-independent. A cluster analysis using z scores was examined to study the performance of subjects classified as either field-dependent or field-independent according to scores obtained on the EFT and the PRFT (“coincident” subjects) and those classified as field-dependent in one test and field-independent in the other (“non-coincident” subjects). No statistically significant differences between the two groups were obtained when cognitive style was defined by scores on the PRFT. When field dependence-independence was measured by scores on the EFT, field-independent girls performed better than field-dependent girls (p < .005), but this outcome was not observed for boys. These results suggest a differential contribution of the “perceptive” and “cognitive” components of field dependence-independence and a modulating role by sex.

Shape and letter cancellation test performance was investigated among large samples of African American, Hispanic, and White non-demented elders. Ethnic minority elders took significantly longer to complete both tasks compared to Whites. An index of task efficiency, which simultaneously measures time and accuracy, suggested that slower time by minority elders was not related to a measurable effort to achieve greater accuracy. The frequency of commission errors was greater in our sample than in previous reports, especially among ethnic minority elders. Although significant differences were observed between the ethnic groups when matched for years of education, equating for literacy level eliminated all performance differences between African Americans and Whites on both cancellation tasks. (JINS, 2004, 10, 401–411.)