This chapter presents an integrated model of text and picture comprehension (ITPC model) that takes into account that learners can use multiple sensory modalities combined with different forms of representation. Multimedia learning can occur in different forms. When learners understand texts and pictures, they construct multiple mental representations in their cognitive system. Research in cognitive psychology suggests that the architecture of the human cognitive system includes multiple memory systems. A common view proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin distinguishes three memory subsystems - sensory registers, working memory, and long-term memory with different functions and different constraints on processing texts and pictures. The ITPC model of text and picture comprehension provides a framework for the analysis of learning from multiple representations including spoken or written text, visual pictures, and sound pictures. Future research will clarify whether the ITPC model is a useful tool for the analysis of text-picture integration.

Dialogical self theory (DST) has something very important to propose to mainstream psychology. This chapter outlines such a proposal, which one can call as a model of the discursive mind. Discursive mind model is based on the thesis of the cognitive system's discursive organization. Different modules contain specific cognitive-affective resources, shaped by different ways of giving meaning to personal experience. There are three fundamental assumptions of the discursive mind model: the modular character of one's knowledge structures, the social origin of one's knowledge structures, and the specificity of the knowledge structures for the social context from which they stem. According to the discursive mind model, I-positions are relatively autonomic modules of the cognitive system, which consist of script-like structures combining personal and socially shared knowledge. The model of the discursive mind assumes that the activation of different I-positions within the same person causes significant intra-individual variations in cognitive functioning.

This chapter first constructs an account of self-beliefs that distinguishes them from beliefs that are merely about the person one happens to be. Next, it considers issues raised by David Rosenthal in his chapter in this book about what he calls the "essential indexicality" of Higher-Order Thoughts (HOTs). Rosenthal's account involves giving up Sydney Shoemaker's principle that a person is immune to certain sorts of errors about her own mental states, namely, whether it is she that is having them. The chapter argues that we should not give up Shoemaker's principle, and that we need not do so to account for the feature of HOTS that Rosenthal calls their "essential indexicality". These issues are crucial for those who are inclined to accept Rosenthal's account of consciousness, in which HOTS play a crucial role.

Neuropsychological evidence offers a great deal to the understanding of normal cognition. This chapter focuses on the techniques and systematic investigations of both individual case studies and of groups of individuals who exhibit disorders of visuospatial working memory following damage to the brain. It addresses the possibility that working memory is best viewed as a multiple component system, and that within such a system, there might be further fractionation between visual and spatial resources with performance on some spatial tasks requiring the use of executive functions. This chapter talks about the relationship between visuospatial working memory, and other parts of the cognitive system by exploring whether or not visuospatial working memory acts as a gateway between perception and long-term memory. It then considers the impairments of different aspects of visuospatial working memory that arise from the phenomena of unilateral spatial neglect and of cortical blindness.