Although wildlife management models across the world have since the early 1980s shifted from top-down fortress conservation to different labels of people-friendly community-based conservation, their outcomes remain contested. This paper explores how, and in whose interests, approaches to wildlife conservation in Malawi have been reconfigured from fortress conservation to market–community collaborative management. Based on qualitative field data, we demonstrate how varying levels of community participation in the processes of wildlife conservation transformed the identities and interests of powerful groups of people regarding wildlife conservation in the Majete Wildlife Reserve. We highlight how commodification and monetarization of wildlife conservation served the interests of the emergent powerful groups whilst marginalizing those of the weak. The work indicates how new community identities with regard to wildlife conservation mask the power hegemonies that dictate mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion regarding natural resource use.

Delegated protected area management (transferring management responsibilities from a public to a private partner) has been promoted to give impetus to ailing protected areas in West and Central Africa. Since their inception in 2005, the number of partnerships has increased to 20 protected areas covering c. 250,000 km2, an area similar to that of the UK. A review of the lessons learnt from these first 15 years shows that delegated management has improved day-to-day management of these protected areas. There remain, however, challenges with funding and with the capacity of national managerial staff, and also concerns regarding human rights. Based on an analysis of these challenges, I develop five recommendations to guide more mature delegated management: governments should (1) ensure an enabling legal–procedural environment; and (2) prepare delegated management contracts systematically; (3) private partners should render themselves dispensable through capacity building of national managerial staff and by initiating sustainable financing mechanisms; (4) governments and private partners alike should respect human rights and build coalitions with communities; (5) governments, private partners and funders should strive to delegate non-core management tasks, such as tourist guiding and reception, community development and research, to specialized locally-based individuals and organizations. Although these recommendations have a specific West–Central African perspective, they have relevance for the increasing number of delegated management initiatives elsewhere in Africa and beyond.

While multiple studies have identified land managers’ preferences for agri-environmental schemes (AES), few approaches exist for integrating different understandings of landscape stewardship into the design of these measures. We compared and contrasted rural land managers’ attitudes toward AES and their preferences for AES design beyond 2020 across different understandings of landscape stewardship. Forty semi-structured interviews were conducted with similar proportions of small holders, medium holders and large holders in southwest Devon, UK. Overall, respondents most frequently cited concerns related to the reduced amount of funding available for entry-level and higher-level stewardship schemes in the UK since 2008, changing funding priorities, perceived overstrict compliance and lack of support for farm succession and new entrants into farming. However, there were differences in concerns across understandings of landscape stewardship, with production respondents citing that AES do not encourage food production, whereas environmental and holistic farmers citing that AES do not support the development of a local green food culture and associated social infrastructure. These differences also emerged in preferences for AES design beyond 2020. We adapted a collaborative and coordinated approach for designing AES to account for the differing interests of land managers based on their understanding of landscape stewardship. We discuss the implications of this approach for environmental policy design in the European Union and elsewhere.

Despite direction by the Conservation Act (1987) to give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand's Department of Conservation has few formal collaborative management arrangements with Maori. Obstacles to establishing agreements that involve Maori in equitable conservation decision-making roles include divergent philosophies (preservation versus conservation for future use), institutional inertia, a lack of concrete models of co-management to evaluate success or otherwise to promote conservation, a lack of resources and opportunities for capacity building and scientific research amongst Maori, opposition and a lack of trust from conservation non-governmental organizations that are predominantly euro-centric in approach and membership, and a fundamental reluctance of some to share power with Maori. Recent examples of work towards co-management emphasize the need for innovative methods to build trust and explore common ground and differences. Meetings on marae (traditional Maori gathering places) have established guiding principles, lengthy dialogue, and a collective symbol as a metaphor for co-management. These were valuable steps towards building trust and understanding required for the restoration of coastal lakes and a river, and the potential joint management of two national parks on the west coast of the North Island. Establishment of a research project to assess the sustainability of a traditional harvest of a sea-bird (Puffinus griseus) by Rakiura Maori was facilitated by drawing up a 'cultural safety' contract. This contract underscored the role of Maori as directors of the research, protected their intellectual property rights to their traditional environmental knowledge, guaranteed continuity of the collaborative research project and regulated how results were to be communicated. The scientific ethics of a university ecological research team were safeguarded by the contract, which ensured that they could publish their inferences without erasure or interference. The New Zealand experience shows that even when legislation signals from the top down that the doorway is open for co-management with indigenous people, this by itself is unlikely to make it happen. Active facilitation by innovative middle-level agreements and the creation of new administrative structures are needed to govern co-management of a broad spectrum of resource issues. Bottom-up initiatives involving single, or very localized, resource uses may also trigger co-management. Models for successful co-management involving indigenous peoples must focus more strongly on issues of equity or power sharing, and therefore may be very different from models directed at a single conservation outcome.