Leadership in crisis response has traditionally been strongly centralized and hierarchical. Top-down command and control is popular, because a strict hierarchy and clear lines of command enable rapid decision-making and coordinated actions. Critics, however, have argued that centralization is both impossible and undesirable during crises, because leaders lack situational awareness and cannot control frontline responders from a distance. They argue that operational personnel should take charge to ensure an adaptive frontline response, potentially at the cost of efficiency and speed. The operational dilemma of crisis leadership revolves therefore around the tension between centralization and decentralization. To deal with this dilemma, it is useful to study how influence is exercised and power circulates during crises. Rather than a static authority structure, different types and phases of crises require different forms of leadership. Authority structures have to be tested and adjusted throughout the response, so they can be continuously co-constructed by frontline responders and operational leaders, as the complex and dynamic crisis situation evolves.

This chapter clarifies why blunt force regulation is so distinctive. It begins by outlining two underlying logics regulatory enforcement, namely, “rules-based” regulation (which prioritizes effectiveness) and “risk-based” regulation (which prioritizes efficiency). Drawing on case details, it then illustrates how blunt force regulation fits into neither category, offering neither efficient nor effective regulation in the long-term. Instead, it represents an unusual combination of indiscriminate enforcement (which devalues compliances) and arbitrary but inflexible enforcement (which increases regulatory distrust and business uncertainty). This raises the question: Why blunt force regulation?

Future naval and air forces will be comprised increasingly of unmanned and autonomous systems. Nearly 100 nations and nonstate actors currently operate unmanned and autonomous systems to support combat operations. These platforms have proven their ability to enhance situational awareness and improve mission performance. Unmanned systems will be used to augment manned platforms and will conduct missions that are considered dull, dirty and dangerous, thereby reducing risk to human life at a reduced cost. Introduction of these systems and vehicles will require states to modify how they characterize these platforms under international law as ships, warships, commercial aircraft and state aircraft to ensure that they are able to legally perform the missions that they have been designed to perform. This will require filling gaps in domestic and international law and regulations to better regulate and control the employment of these systems in the marine environment to ensure safety of navigation and overflight and protection of the marine environment.

Key Learning Points

1. 1. Read and understand your organisation’s mass casualty plan. Know your role.

2. 2. Plan for a surge in patients, and understand how additional capacity may be created.

3. 3. Anticipate communication difficulties, and introduce redundancies to mitigate this risk.

4. 4. Additional staff will be required for days to weeks afterwards.

5. 5. Care for the physical and psychological health of your staff.

The Iranian state is a complex political machine. Today’s Iran is a product of the combined forces of evolutionary change and abrupt political upheavals. The Iranian state is remarkable for its longevity and its combination of traditional and modern (Western) features, which has resulted from its long and varied life. The Islamic Republic is a product of a series of political compromises that have their origins partly in the bureaucracy created by the Pahlavis and partly in the interactions of the revolutionary coalition that wrested power from the monarch in 1979.

Effective administration of healthcare in an emergency setting, especially in field-hospital deployment where order must be established, needs assessed and limited resources allocated effectively, is considerably more complex than the regular patient–doctor interactions characteristic of routine times. Due to the complexity and uncertainty typical of such an environment, leadership is required not only by the field hospital staff but also by the affected public, which seeks leadership in those who are perceived to be the center of clinical service delivery.

This type of leadership demands organized command and control and practice of more than just basic leadership processes, and therefore requires, alongside the mission leader, a structured management and task-orientated chain of command.

For the hospital to operate effectively and independently, it is necessary to also define the organizational structure. The organizational structure discussed in this chapter is a model tested over the past three decades by the IDF Medical Corps hospital in numerous missions. This structure is generally similar to the basic structure of a small- to medium-scale hospital in routine times. At the same time, it allows more focused and simple managing processes required in non-routine scenarios such as emergencies or disasters.