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One of the most common criticisms of Fantasy is that it is repetitive, derivative and uninspired. This chapter argues that this is a misconception. Rather than repeating, Fantasy iterates: its creators self-consciously rework tropes and patterns in manners that acknowledge the necessarily entangled nature of human communications and cultures. Drawing on work by Colin Burrow on imitation and Linda Hutcheon on adaptation, it argues that originality is recent, problematic and overrated as a criterion for judging art, and that fantasies demonstrate a productive awareness of culture as being collaborative and renegotiable. The main subjects discussed include Diana Wynne Jones’s The Tough Guide to Fantasyland and The Dark Lord of Derkholm; Thomas Malory’s Launcelot and T. H. White’s Lancelot; Death in Neil Gaiman’s The Sandman; dragons many and various; Terry Brooks’ much-maligned The Sword of Shannara; fan fiction and N.K. Jemisin’s Inheritance series; and the marriage of lore and mechanics in Magic: The Gathering. The chapter closes by considering the archetype-focused criticism of Vladimir Propp and Joseph Campbell, discussing both the attractions of such models and how imposing grand patterns can blind us to both stories’ irreducible specifics and their exclusions.
It really seems time to take into account the consequences of the fact that countries, particularly leading or developed ones, reversing the course of several millennia, no longer envision international war as a sensible method for resolving their disputes. Indeed, the aversion to international war or the rise of something of a culture or society of international peace that has substantially enveloped the world should be seen as a causative or facilitating independent variable. International war seems to be in pronounced decline because of the way attitudes toward it have changed, roughly following the pattern by which the institution of formal slavery became discredited and then obsolete. Under the circumstances, there is potential virtue in the traditionally maligned diplomatic techniques of complacency and appeasement for dealing with international problems. The phenomenon asuggests that there is little justification for the continuing and popular tendency to inflate threats and dangers in the international arena—even to the point of deeming some of them to be “existential.” In addition, although problems certainly continue to exist, none of these are substantial enough to require the United States (or pretty much anybody) to maintain a large standing military force for dealing with them.
It could be said that American foreign policy since 1945 has been one long miscue; most international threats - including during the Cold War - have been substantially exaggerated. The result has been agony and bloviation, unnecessary and costly military interventions that have mostly failed. A policy of complacency and appeasement likely would have worked better. In this highly readable book, John Mueller argues with wisdom and wit rather than ideology and hyperbole that aversion to international war has had considerable consequences. There has seldom been significant danger of major war. Nuclear weapons, international institutions, and America's super power role have been substantially irrelevant; post-Cold War policy has been animated more by vast proclamation and half-vast execution than by the appeals of liberal hegemony; and post-9/11 concerns about international terrorism and nuclear proliferation have been overwrought and often destructive. Meanwhile, threats from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, or from cyber technology are limited and manageable. Unlikely to charm Washington, Mueller explains how, when international war is in decline, complacency and appeasement become viable diplomatic devices and a large military is scarcely required.
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